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“A rule of international law, whether customary or conventional, does not operate in a 
vacuum. It operates in relation to facts and in the context of a wider framework of legal rules 
of which it forms only a part.”1 This idea was expressed by the ICJ already in 1980 and 
should still be one of the cornerstones of international law. It has been argued that the conflict 
between functional regimes of international law is one of the most pressing problems of the 
fragmentation of international law. 2  Thus, during recent decades there have been many 
discussions and debates questioning whether international law is fragmented and, if yes, to 
what extent it is fragmented. At the same time, there are still many controversial opinions and 
unanswered questions. 
 
One of these is the position of the WTO in the fragmentation process - how does it affect the 
fragmentation of international law? The WTO concerns only a very specific area and very 
specific cases. Even though the Appellate Body of the WTO has stated in its first report that 
the WTO law “should not be read in clinical isolation from public international law”3, there 
still persists the question whether this statement is actually followed during the WTO dispute 
settlement process. Thus, the current thesis is concentrating on the role of the WTO dispute 
settlement in the fragmentation of international law. 
 
There are different ways of how to address the problem of fragmentation of international law. 
The present thesis is concentrating only on the topic of treaty interpretation, as this is one of 
the central tasks of every international court and tribunal. It concentrates on the treaty 
interpretation rules of the VCLT - the so-called “treaty on treaties” - as this covers the most 
important areas of treaty interpretation and is the indispensable starting point for any 
description of the law.4 More precisely, the treaty interpretation methods laid down in the 
Art. 31(1) of the VCLT and the application of the Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT in the WTO 
dispute settlement will be analysed.  
                                                         
1 Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. 
Reports 1980, p. 73, para. 10.  
2 Michaels, R., Pauwelyn, J. Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws?: Different Techniques in the Fragmentation 
of Public International Law. - Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law. 2012/22, p. 367.   
3  Appellate Body Report. United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline. 1996. 
WT/DS2/AB/R, p. 16; Delimatsis, P. The Fragmentation of International Trade Law. 2010. Available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1554909 (15.04.2017), p. 11.  
4 Aust, A. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969). 2006. - Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law. Available at: http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e1498?rskey=t4avbk&result=1&prd=EPIL (15.04.2017), para. 1. 
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In the view of fragmentation of international law the interpretation of a treaty plays an 
extremely important role.5 On the one hand, treaty interpretation can be seen as a diplomacy 
which avoids or mitigates normative conflict.6 Treaty interpretation results in releasing the 
exact meaning and the content of the rule of law that is applicable to a given situation.7 
Therefore, treaty interpretation can be part of the solution to fragmentation. 8  Treaty 
interpretation may offer shared hermeneutics in search of a more systemic integration of 
diverse treaties and tribunals and inject a degree of coherence into the fragmented landscape 
of international law. 9  On the other hand, treaty interpretation may also be part of the 
fragmentation of international law. Different tribunals may interpret the same rules 
differently, each having their own guiding objective, underlying value system, and 
interpretative community, thereby contributing to the fragmentation of international law.10  
 
It is not clear that even if the practice of the WTO dispute settlement increases the 
fragmentation of international law related to treaty interpretation, what is the real effect of it 
to the international community and international law in general. There are many scholars who 
have criticised the WTO Appellate Body and panels for its reports which conflict with the 
interpretation rules of the VCLT. 11 But very often these articles do not get further from 
                                                         
5 Elsig, M. Pauwelyn, J. The Politics of Treaty Interpretation: Variations and Explanations across International 
Tribunals. 2011. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1938618 (15.04.2017), p. 3.  
6  Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission. Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi. 
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International 
Law. 2006. A/CN.4/L.682. Avilable at: 
http://www.repositoriocdpd.net:8080/bitstream/handle/123456789/676/Inf_KoskenniemiM_FragmentationIntern
ationalLaw_2006.pdf?sequence=1 (15.04.2017)., para. 37. 
7 Sorel, J.-M., Boré Eveno, V. Art. 31, para. 3. - Corten and Klein, P. (eds). The Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties. A Commentary. Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011; Daillier, P. et al. A. Droit 
international public. 7e ed. Paris: LGDJ 2002, p. 253.   
8 Elsig and Pauwelyn, p. 3. 
9 Bianchi, A. Textual Interpretation and (International) Law Reading: the Myth of (In)determinacy and the 
Genealogy of Meanin. - Bekker, P. Dolzer, R. Waibel, M. (eds). Making Transnational Law Work in the Global 
Economy: Essays in Honour of Detlev Vagts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010, pp 34-55. 
10  Crema, L. Disappearance and New Sightings of Restrictive Interpretation(s). - European Journal of 
International Law. 2010/21. No. 3, pp 681–700; Sorel, J.-M., Boré Eveno, V. Art. 31, para. 3. - Corten and 
Klein; Daillier et al, p. 170.  
11 See for example: Gruszczynski, p. 36; Ortino, F. Treaty Interpretation and the WTO Appellate Body Report in 
US - Gambling: A critique. - Journal of International Economic Law. 2006/9. Issue 1; Chung, C.-M. Interpreting 
“Interconnection”: Hermeneutics of the WTO Mexico-Telecommunications Case. 2006. Available at: 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/060301.pdf (15.04.2017); McRae, D. Treaty 
Interpretation and the Development of International Trade Law by the WTO Appellate Body. - Sacredoti, G., 
Yanovich, A., Bohanes, J. (eds). The WTO at Ten. The Contribution of the Dispute Settlement System. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006; Delimatsis, p. 14; Pauwelyn, J. Conflict of Norms in Public 
International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2003; Broude, T. International Governance in the WTO: Judicial Boundaries and Political 
Capitulation. London: Cameron May 2004, pp 267-268; Mitchell, A. D. Legal Principles in WTO Disputes. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008, p. 66. 
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criticising certain reports. We can read between the lines negative opinion about this 
phenomenon, but the further effects are hardly ever analysed. Thus, there is a need to analyse 
the real practice of the fragmentation of treaty interpretation in the WTO dispute settlement. 
Do these reports bring real effects in practice? Are the states also concerned about the way 
how the treaties are being interpreted in the WTO dispute settlement? Or is it rather a fiction 
and a problem existing only in academic papers? Thus, the aim of the master’s thesis is to find 
out how the fragmentation of treaty interpretation in the WTO dispute settlement affects 
international law and international community in general.  
 
To conclude on the research problems - there are two research questions that will be solved. 
Firstly, is the practice of treaty interpretation in the WTO dispute settlement fragmented? 
Secondly, to the extent that the answer to the first question is affirmative, which are the 
possible effects of the fragmented practice of treaty interpretation in the WTO dispute 
settlement to the international community and international law in general? Respectively, 
there are two hypotheses of the master’s thesis. Firstly, the practice of treaty interpretation is 
fragmented in the WTO dispute settlement. Secondly, the fragmentation of treaty 
interpretation in the WTO dispute settlement affects the international community and 
international law in general, but these effects are not fundamental.  
 
During writing the master’s thesis, various combined research methods have been used to find 
satisfying and adequate answers to the research questions. Mostly the analytical and 
systematic methods are used. The research problem and questions are approached in a 
systematic way. First it is explained whether the practice of treaty interpretation is fragmented 
in the WTO dispute settlement and afterwards, to the extent that the answer to the first 
question is affirmative, the effect of it is analysed. Some examples of these cases which 
address the questions of treaty interpretation are analysed and compared to each other but also 
to cases from other international courts and tribunals. Thus, also the comparative method is 
used. The analytical and comparative methods are also used to analyse the possible results of 
the fragmented practice of treaty interpretation in the WTO dispute settlement and to compare 
the opinions on the current issue by different scholars.  
 
The present thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter introduces the general terms 
used in the paper to give an overview and understanding to the reader. First of all, it explains 
the fragmentation of international law as a phenomenon. It explains the meaning of 
fragmentation of international law, but also analyses the background and possible reasons of 
 7 
it. Furthermore, the first chapter also gives an overview of international trade law as part of 
international law and explains how the WTO law is linked to international trade law. This is 
the necessary knowledge to continue with the research problems and it answers also the 
question, whether the VCLT is and should be applicable in the WTO dispute settlement.  
 
The second chapter is dealing directly with the first research question - whether the practice 
of treaty interpretation is fragmented on the example of the WTO dispute settlement. It 
concentrates on one topic - interpretation of a treaty - which has different angles. Firstly, it 
analyses whether the WTO Appellate Body and panels use in their practice interpretation 
methods laid down in the Art. 31(1) of the VCLT and whether they use a holistic approach 
while interpreting a treaty. Secondly, it concentrates on the Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT and 
analyses whether the WTO Appellate Body and panels take into account general rules of 
international law and rules of other specific regimes of international law while interpreting a 
treaty. 
 
The third chapter analyses the impact of the fragmented practice of treaty interpretation in the 
WTO dispute settlement to the international community and law in general. It presents the 
ideas from scholars, but also my own ideas, and gives my overall opinion on the topic. The 
aim of this chapter is not to say conclusively whether the fragmentation of treaty 
interpretation in the WTO dispute settlement is negative or positive. It rather analyses all the 
possible outcomes of it and also the possibility of their occurrence in reality.  
 
While writing the thesis I have used a wide range of sources, for example legal articles, 
research papers and books from different legal scholars, like M. Koskenniemi, J. Pauwelyn 
and D. McRae who have often addressed the problem of fragmentation of international law in 
their works. The most important normative source used is the VCLT, but some other treaties, 
like the GATT, the WTO Agreement and the NAFTA, are referred to. The thesis also 
analyses the case law from the WTO dispute settlement and from other international courts 
and tribunals. Only these cases are analysed which address the question of treaty 
interpretation.12 I worked through all the relevant case law of the WTO dispute settlement 
since the establishment of the WTO in 1995 and, taking into consideration the limited length 
of the master’s thesis, made a choice which cases to reflect in the current thesis. I decided to 
                                                         
12 The case law from the years 1995-2013 has been brought out by topics in the following book: Appellate Body 
Secretariat (editor). WTO Appellate Body Repertory of Reports and Awards 1995-2013. 2 Volume Set. 5th ed. 
Geneva: WTO Publications 2015. The list of the cases in the WTO dispute settlement is available on the Website 
of the WTO: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds193_e.htm (15.04.2017).  
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concentrate mostly on cases which have been criticised by many scholars, because this gave 
me also an opportunity to analyse the criticism and give my opinion whether it is justified or 
not.  
 
The keywords provided by the Estonian Subject Thesaurus that the best characterise the 
current master’s thesis are the following: international law, international trade, interpretation, 





1. Fragmentation of international law and international trade law in 
general 
 
The current chapter gives an overview of the fundamental topics of the current master’s thesis 
- fragmentation of international law (section 1.1.) and international trade law and, especially, 
the position of the WTO in it (section 1.2.).  
 
1.1. Fragmentation of international law as a phenomenon 
 
Firstly, the meaning of the phenomenon of fragmentation will be explained (section 1.1.1.) 
and, secondly, the background and possible reasons of the fragmentation of international law 
will be discussed (section 1.1.2.).  
 
1.1.1. Meaning  
 
The dictionary definition of fragmentation is “the process or state of breaking or being broken 
into fragments”.13 In legal context the term “fragmentation” can be defined as the emergence 
of specialised and relatively autonomous spheres of social action and structure. 14  To 
understand the real meaning of the fragmentation of international law it is necessary to 
understand also the meaning of a conflict, because the fragmentation of international law is 
basically conflicting laws or practices. Many definitions for the term “conflict” can be found. 
In the current thesis a conflict is seen as a situation where in substantive law two rules or 
principles suggest different ways of dealing with a problem 15  or where in practice of 
international courts and tribunals different institutions have adopted conflicting practice 
relating to the same or similar question.  
 
The opposite to the fragmentation of international law is the unity or coherence of it. The 
dictionary definition of unity is “the state of being united or joined as a whole”16 and of 
                                                         
13  Fragmentation. Oxford Dictionaries Online. Available at: 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/fragmentation (15.04.2017). 
14 Shaw, M. N. International Law. 6th ed. New York: Cambridge University Press 2008, p. 66. 
15 Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, para. 25. 
16  Unity. Oxford Dictionaries Online. Available at: 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/unity?q=unity (15.04.2017). 
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coherence is “the quality of forming a unified whole”. 17  The unity and coherence of 
international law attributes universality to the core content of international law.18  
 
The phenomenon of fragmentation of international law derives from the diversity of 
international law both in substance and procedure.19 There are different approaches to the 
fragmentation of substantial law and to the fragmented practice of international law. In the 
current thesis it is explained based on the approaches by J. Pauwelyn and the ILC working 




Figure 1. The types of fragmentation of international law 
 
Firstly, there can be conflicts of substantial law between general international law and a 
special regime of international law.20 The substance of international law can be fragmented 
along different regimes such as human rights law, international economic law, environmental 
                                                         
17 Coherence. Oxford Dictionaries Online. Available at: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/coherence 
(15.04.2017). 
18 Rao, P. S. Multiple International Judicial Forums: A Reflection of the Growing Strength of International Law 
or its Fragmentation? - Michigan Journal of International Law. 2004/25. Issue 4, p. 930. 
19 Pauwelyn, J. Fragmentation of International Law. 2006. - Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law. Available at: http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e1406?rskey=MyjMcN&result=1&prd=EPIL (15.04.2017), para. 2.  
20 Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, para. 46. 
Fragmentation of the 
substance of international 
law
1) General international law norm vs  
norm from a specific regime
2) Conflicting norms from different 
regimes of international law
Conflicting norms from different 
geographical or regional lines
Parallel and conflicting norms or 
obligations in the same regime
Fragmentation of the 
practice of international 
law
Conflicting practice of different courts 
and tribunals from different regimes
Conflicting practice of different 
geographical or regional courts and 
tribunals
Conflicting practice of parallel 
obligations in the same regime
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law, humanitarian law, international criminal law and the law of the sea.21 These regimes 
often correspond to functionally specialized international organizations, like the WTO, 
UNEP, WIPO, ILO, WHO etc.22 Each regime comes with its own principles and its own form 
of expertise which is not necessarily identical to the principles and form of expertise of 
neighboring specialization.23  
 
Fragmentation of, or between, those regimes becomes an issue when such functionally 
specialized regimes claim autonomy either from each other or from general international 
law.24 For instance, trade law and environmental law have highly specific objectives and rely 
on principles that may often point in different directions.25 Also, very often new rules or 
regimes develop precisely in order to deviate from what was earlier provided by the general 
law.26 The current thesis is also concerning one of the specific regimes of international law - 
the international trade law which is defined and more explained in the section 1.2.  
 
Secondly, substantial international law is fragmented also along geographical or regional 
lines.27 Even if it concerns the same regime, for example international trade law or human 
rights law, international law differs depending on the state or region in question.28 
 
Thirdly, previous two types of substance fragmentation also give rise to another form of 
substance fragmentation, namely parallel or conflicting norms or obligations in the same 
issue-area applying to the same states or subjects of international law.29 Whereas both issue-
area fragmentation and regional fragmentation are horizontal in nature - between subject areas 
or between regions - parallel norms in the same issue-area applying to the same subject are 
vertical in nature, potentially raising conflicts between different levels of regulation of the 
same subject area.30 
 
                                                         
21 Pauwelyn 2006, para. 2. 
22 Ibid.  
23 Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, para. 15. 
24 Pauwelyn 2006, para. 2.  
25 Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, para. 15.  
26 Ibid. 
27 Forteau, M. Regional International Law. 2006. - Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. 
Available at: http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e1463?rskey=lYr8o0&result=1&prd=EPIL (15.04.2017), para. 6; Pauwelyn 2006, para. 3. 
28 Pauwelyn 2006, para. 3.  
29 Banaszewska, D. M. Lex Specialis. 2015. - Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. Available 
at: http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e2171?rskey=xSQVEM&result=1&prd=EPIL (15.04.2017), para 1; Pauwelyn 2006, para. 4. 
30 Pauwelyn 2006, para. 4. 
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Besides the fragmentation of substantial international law, the diversity of international law 
extends also to procedure. 31  Procedure fragmentation arises in the context of multiple 
international courts and tribunals.32 Following the three types of substance fragmentation 
described earlier, the practice of international courts and tribunals may be fragmented in the 
same way.33 Firstly, the procedure fragmentation can exist on a functional or regime lines.34 
Secondly, the practice of international courts and tribunals can be fragmented on geographical 
or regional lines. 35  Thirdly, the practice of international courts and tribunals can be 
fragmented as a result of parallel obligations in the same regime for the same subjects.36  
 
The current thesis concentrates on the fragmented practice of international law, more 
precisely, on conflicting practice of the WTO dispute settlement and other international courts 
and tribunals. In the next section the background and possible reasons of the fragmentation of 
international law will be discussed.  
 
1.1.2. Background and reasons 
 
Fragmentation of international law is not at all a new phenomenon.37  It is a result of the 
significant development of international law over time which concerns its basis, its substance, 
its structural principles and its addressees.38 International law has mutated from a legal system 
reflecting the need to guide the co-existence of a few subjects of international law to an 
embracing legal regime in which the international community participates.39 
 
The background of fragmentation of international law was sketched already in the 1950-s by 
W. Jenks.40 He wrote: “Law-making treaties are tending to develop in a number of historical, 
functional and regional groups which are separate from each other and whose mutual 
relationships are in some respects analogous to those of separate systems of municipal law. 
/.../ One of the most serious sources of conflict between law-making treaties is the important 
                                                         
31 Pauwelyn 2006, para. 5.  
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid.  
34 Ibid.  
35 Ibid.  
36 Ibid.  
37 Pauwelyn 2006, para. 7. 
38 Wolfrum, R. International Law. 2006. - Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. Available at: 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1424?prd=EPIL 
(15.04.2017), para. 91.  
39 Ibid. 
40 Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, para. 5.  
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development of the law governing the revision of multilateral instruments and defending the 
legal effects of revision.”41 
 
Firstly, already in the 1950s one of the main reasons of the fragmentation of international law 
- the fast development of international law42 - was pointed out. It is characteristic to any law 
that it may change over time. 43  International law has not just expanded horizontally to 
embrace the new states which have been established since the end of the Second World 
War.44 It has extended itself to include individuals, groups and international organisations, 
both private and public, within its scope.45 But most importantly - it has also moved into new 
regimes covering such issues as international trade, problems of environmental protection, 
human rights, outer space explorations etc.46  
 
One of the major problems of international law is to determine when and how to incorporate 
new standards of behaviour and new realities of life into the already existing framework, so 
that, on the one hand, the law remains relevant and, on the other hand, the system itself is not 
too vigorously disrupted. 47  Therefore, the rise of specialized regimes that have no clear 
relationship to each other has brought up the question about fragmentation of international 
law. Each of these different regime of international law regulates a specific set of ideas, 
values and corresponding institutional practice of professional experts knowledgeable in the 
language and vocabulary of the specialisation.48 There is a concern that irresolvable systemic 
conflicts may arise if the broader and general international legal system does not support or 
provide normative context for the interaction between these differentiated international legal 
systems.49 
 
                                                         
41 Jenks, C. W. The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties. - British Yearbook of International Law. 1953/30, p. 430.  
42 See also: Andenas, M. Reassertion and Transformation: From Fragmentation to Convergence in International 
Law. - Georgetown Journal of International Law. 2015/46; Hafner, G. Pros and Cons Ensuing from 
Fragmentation of International Law - Michigan Journal of International Law. 2004/25, p. 854; Pauwelyn 2003, 
p. 14. 
43 Pauwelyn 2003, p. 14.  
44 Shaw, p. 45.  
45 Ibid, p. 45.  
46 Ibid, p. 45. 
47 Ibid, p. 43.  
48 Treves, T. Fragmentation of International Law: The Judicial Perspective. - Agenda Internacional. 2009. Año 
XVI. N° 27, p. 216; Yearwood, R. R. F. The Interaction Between World Trade Organisation (WTO) Law and 
External International Law: The Constrained Openness of WTO lae (a prologue to a theory). New York: 
Routledge 2012, p. 29. 
49 Yearwood, p. 29. 
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Secondly, the quote of W. Jenks reflects another reason of fragmentation of international law 
- the lack of centralised organs.50 The rise of international and regional organisations is also a 
feature of modern international law. 51  International organisations have been accepted as 
possessing rights and duties on their own and a distinctive legal personality.52 
 
The phenomenon of fragmentation of international law gained prominence after the end of the 
Second World War and, even more so, since the end of the Cold War.53 After the Second 
World War the international order was built on functional divisions, for instance the so-called 
Bretton Woods institutions (IBRD, World Bank, IMF and GATT) focused on the world’s 
economic problems and the UN institutions dealing with the world’s security and political 
problems.54 Specialized UN agencies, in turn, were tasked with specialized, expert-run subject 
matters such as food and agriculture (FAO and WFP), communications (ITU), labor (ILO), 
intellectual property (WIPO) and the environment (UNEP). 55  Originally, these different 
international organisations operated largely in isolation.56 The increasing role of international 
organisations on the international scene is one of the factors contributing to the move of the 
international legal system away from its traditional status as the exclusive realm of states.57 
 
Thirdly, there is also no centralised adjudicator in international law or no hierarchical 
international court system. 58  Even though the ICJ has a widespread nickname “World 
Court”59 and is, for instance, in media sometimes referred to as “the world’s highest court”60, 
                                                         
50  See also: Abi-Saab, G. Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding remarks. - NYU Journal of 
International Law and Politics. 1999/31, p. 926; Hafner, p. 854; Hestermeyer, H. Human Rights and the WTO: 
The Case of Patents and Access to Medicines. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007, p. 170; Gruszczynski, 
p. 4; Pauwelyn 2003, p. 13; Pauwelyn 2006, para. 7; Report of the Study Group of the International Law 
Commission 2006, para. 5. 
51 Shaw, p. 47. 
52 Ibid.  
53 Hafner, p. 849; Pauwelyn, J. Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: International Law as a Universe of Inter-
Connected Islands. - Michigan Journal of International Law. 2004/25; Pauwelyn 2006, para. 8. 
54 Pauwelyn 2006, para. 8. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Wellens, K. Fragmentation of International Law and Establishing Accountability Regime for International 
Organizations: The Role of the Judiciary in Closing the Gap. - Michigan Journal of International Law. 2004/25. 
Issue 4, p. 1160. 
58 Pauwelyn 2003, p. 16.  
59 See for example: Llamzon, A. P. Jurisdiction and Compliance in Recent Decisions of the International Court 
of Justice. - The European Journal of International Law. 2008/18. No. 5, p. 815; Bekker, P. H. F., Levine, J., 
Weinacht, F. The World Court Dismisses Serbia and Montenegro’s Complaints Against Eight NATO Members. 
- American Society of International Law. 2004/8. Issue 30; Shaw, p. 1057; Kwiatkowska, B. Decisions of the 
World Court Relevant to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. A Reference Guide. The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International 2002.  
60 See for example: Escritt, T. World’s Highest Court Will Hear a Case from a Tiny Island Country in the Pacific 
That’s Taking on 3 Nuclear Nations. - Business Insider. 4 March 2016. Avilable at: 
http://www.businessinsider.com/the-worlds-highest-court-will-hear-a-case-from-a-tiny-island-country-in-the-
pacific-thats-taking-on-3-nuclear-nations-2016-3?r=US&IR=T&IR=T (15.04.2017); Jaura, R. World’s Highest 
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it does not enjoy a higher position than every other court. The Art. 92 of the UN Charter 
designates the ICJ as the principal judicial organ of the UN, but there is no formal hierarchy 
of international courts and tribunals.61  
 
Fourthly, the increase in the case-load of existing tribunals and the establishment of new 
tribunals and courts is also one of the reasons of the fragmentation of international law.62 
Since the end of the Cold War a multitude of new international courts and tribunals have been 
created including the ITLOS, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, the ICTY, the ICTR, the 
ICC, the NAFTA tribunals, the investment tribunals under BITs and the ACtHPR.63 This 
situation is  also referred to as proliferation of international courts and tribunals.64 
 
On the one hand, the increasing practice of courts and supervisory bodies strengthens the 
adjudicatory process in international law, and may be seen as strengthening the international 
rule of law.65 International law is more likely now than ever before to be followed up through 
formalised procedures designed to ensure that the law is applied in specific cases.66 On the 
other hand, this development poses also challenges to the unity of international law. Most of 
these courts operate within their own special regime (functional, regional or national) and will 
primarily interpret and apply international law within the framework of that particular 
regime.67 
 
                                                                                                                                                                               
Court Addresses Nuclear Disarmament. - InDepthNews. 13 March 2016. Avilable at: 
http://www.indepthnews.net/index.php/global-governance/united-nations/249-world-s-highest-court-addresses-
nuclear-disarmament (15.04.2017).  
61 Linton, S., Tiba, F. K. The International Judge in an Age of Multiple International Courts and Tribunals. - 
Chicago Journal of International Law. 2009/9. No. 9, p. 415; Oellers-Frahm, K. Multiciplation of International 
Courts and Tribunals and Conflicting Jurisdiction - Problems and Possible Solutions. - Frowein, J. A., Wolfrum, 
R. (eds). Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law. Vol 5. 2001. The Hague: Kluwer Law International 
2001, p. 75; Shabtai, R. International Court of Justice (ICJ). 2006. - Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law. Available at:  http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e34?rskey=D1s2Et&result=1&prd=EPIL (15.04.2017), para. 20. 
62  Dupuy, P.-M. The Danger of Fragmentation or Unification of the International Legal System and the 
International Court of Justice. - NYU Journal of International Law and Politics. 1999/31, p. 792; Fauchald, O. 
K., Nollkaemper, A. Introduction. - Fauchald, O. K., Nollkaemper, A. (eds). The Practice of International and 
National Courts and the (De-)Fragmentation of International Law. Portland: Hart Publishing 2014, p. 4; 
Kingsbury, B. Foreword: Is the Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals a Systemic Problem? - NYU 
Journal of International Law and Politics. 1999/31, p. 679; Reinisch 2011, para. 15. 
63 Pauwelyn 2006, para. 8. 
64 Charney, J. I. The Implications of Expanding International Dispute Settlement Systems: The 1982 Convention 
on the Law of the Sea. - American Journal of International Law. 1996/90, p. 69; Reinisch, A. International 
Courts and Tribunals, Multiple Jurisdiction. 2011. - Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. 
Available at: http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e41?rskey=g4r0RT&result=1&prd=EPIL (15.04.2017), para. 2; Shaw, p. 1115. 




Fifthly, another reason for fragmentation of international law is the multitude of law-makers 
at the domestic level. 68  Although the states are considered under international law to 
constitute one single entity, in practice they are represented by a multitude of domestic actors 
in the international law-making process.69 Even if for most treaties parliament’s approval may 
be required, the fact remains that treaties are not normally negotiated by the members of 
parliament but by diplomats or civil servants.70 And the delegates representing a state in the 
WTO context are not the same as those representing the same state in the UNEP, WHO or 
WIPO.71 In addition, it is often the case that also different private interest groups are at play in 
different treaty settings.72 When it comes to the creation of customary international law , the 
variety of actors is arguably even wider.73 Therefore, the multitude of actors having a role in 
the construction of one and the same state’s consent is another factor that increases the risk of 
inconsistencies arising between different norms or expressions of the same state’s consent.74 
 
Sixthly, one of the reasons of fragmentation of international law is also the transposition of 
functional differentiations of governance from the national to the international level.75  It 
means that international law today increasingly reflects the differentiation of branches of the 
law which are familiar to us from the domestic sphere.76  
 
Last but not least, it should be noted that the increased reliance on soft law, for example, on 
declarations of international conferences or resolutions of the UN General Assembly which 
are essentially of a recommendatory value could cause confusion about the normative value 
of prescriptions in general.77 Soft law, which by definition is not related to formal sources as 
prescribed under Art. 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ could be interpreted and applied 
differently by different states, but also by different international courts and tribunals.78 The 
result of such diversification of sources and the dilution of the form and content of 
international law could be its fragmentation.79 
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In conclusion, the fragmentation of international law as a phenomenon was noticed already 
decades ago and there are different reasons for it: the fast development of international law, 
the lack of centralised organs, the lack of centralised adjudicator, the proliferation of 
international courts, the increase of case-load of international courts, the multitude of law-
makers at the domestic level, the transposition of functional differentiations of governance 
from the national to the international level and the reliance on soft law.  
 
1.2. International trade law as a special regime of international law 
 
The current section gives an overview of international trade law as a special regime of 
international law. Firstly, the meaning of international trade law in general will be explained 
(section 1.2.1.) and, secondly, the WTO law and the WTO dispute settlement system as a 
central element of international trade law will be examined (section 1.2.2.).  
 
1.2.1. International trade law in general 
 
In the past, international trade law, and in particular the GATT law which is the predecessor 
of the WTO law, was often considered to be an independent body of legal rules at the margins 
of international law.80 Even though sometimes there is still disagreement among the scholars 
whether the international trade law is part of international law or not, 81  it is mostly 
uncontested that the WTO is an integral part of international law, and its role is increasing in 
importance.82 
 
International trade law is considered as part of international economic law which is a very 
broad field of international law. 83  International economic law governs the international 
economic order which can be understood as the ensemble of policies, rules and institutions of 
the world economy. 84  International trade is the exchange of goods or services between 
                                                         
80 van den Bossche, P., Prévost, D. Essentials of WTO Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2016, p. 8.  
81 Pauwelyn 2003, p. 29. See also: McRae, D. The Contribution of International Trade Law to the Development 
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82 van den Bossche and Prévost, p. 8.  
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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008, p. 36. 
84 Herdegen, M. Principles of International Economic Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013, p. 3; Stoll, 
P.-T. World Trade Organization (WTO). 2014. - Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. 
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e1555?rskey=DTvSPI&result=1&prd=EPIL (15.04.2017), para. 90. 
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nations. 85  International trade law includes numerous levels of trade organisations and 
interactions.86 It consists of, on the one hand, numerous bilateral or regional trade agreements 
and, on the other hand,  multilateral trade agreements.87  
 
There are different reasons why there is a need for specific international trade rules. Firstly, 
countries must be restrained from adopting trade-restrictive measures both in their own 
interest and in the interest of the world economy.88 Countries realise that, if they take trade-
restrictive measures, other countries will do so too.89  
 
Secondly, international trade rules are necessary, because the traders and investors need a 
degree of security and predictability. 90  Traders and investors operating, or intending to 
operate, in a country that is bound by international legal rules will be able to predict better 
how that country will act in the future on matters affecting their operations in that country.91 
The predictability and security resulting from international trade rules will encourage 
investments and trade and will thus contribute to global economic welfare.92  
 
Thirdly, national governments alone cannot cope with the challenges presented by economic 
globalisation.93 The protection of important societal values such as public health, a clean 
environment, consumer safety, cultural identity and minimum labour standards is, as a result 
of increased levels of trade in goods and services, no longer a purely national matter.94 
 
Fourthly, international trade rules help to achieve a greater measure of equity in international 
economic relations.95 Without international trade rules that are binding and enforceable on 
rich as well as poor countries, many countries would not be able to integrate fully in the world 
trading system and derive an equitable share of the gains of international trade.96  
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91 van den Bossche, p. 33. 
92 Ibid. 
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94  10 Things the WTO Can Do. The Website of the WTO. Available at: 
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34. See also: The preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. 
95 Vijayasri, G. V. The Importance of International Trade in the World. - International Journal of Marketing, 
Financial Services & Management Research. 2013/2. No. 9, pp 112-113; van den Bossche, p. 34; van den 
Bossche and Prévost, p. 2.   
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It has been found that before the WTO, the GATT used to be both the so-called “constitution 
of international trade law” and the dominant multilateral international trade institution. 97 
The Art. XXIX of the GATT makes clear that the GATT was intended only as a provisional 
legal instrument.98 The principal and enduring agreement was to be the Havana Charter which 
established the ITO, and the ITO was to be the key multilateral trade body.99  
 
In reality, until the WTO was established on 1st of January 1995, the GATT filled the void 
created by the rejection of the ITO.100 The ITO charter never entered into force, because it 
was opposed by the Congress of the USA which feared that the ITO would encroach 
excessively on domestic sovereignty.101 Until the 1st of January 1995 the GATT remained the 
most important legal document in all of international trade law. 102 And even though the 
GATT was not intended to be an international organisation, it gradually evolved into an 
international organisation based in Geneva.103  
 
However, despite the relative effectiveness of the dispute settlement regime of the GATT, a 
number of countries (especially the USA) became dissatisfied with the functioning of the 
dispute settlement system.104 The problems with the GATT were the lack of a charter granting 
it legal personality, establishing its procedures and organisational structure. 105  Also, the 
disadvantages were the fact that the GATT had only provisional application, the fact that the 
Protocol of Provisional Application contained provisions enabling the GATT contracting 
parties to maintain legislation that was in force on accession to the GATT and was 
inconsistent with the GATT.106 Furthermore, there existed ambiguity and confusion about the 
GATT’s authority, decision making ability, and legal status.107 
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Since 1995 the WTO has taken the central position in international trade law108 and currently 
it is the only global international organisation dealing with the rules of trade between the 
nations. 109  The WTO law and its dispute settlement mechanisms are discussed more 
thoroughly in the following section. 
 
1.2.2. The WTO law and the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO as parts of 
international trade law 
 
The idea of creating a world trade organisation emerged slowly from various needs and 
suggestions.110 The genesis of the WTO lay in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, which took place under the framework of the GATT and were launched in 1986 
as a consequence of the GATT Trade Ministers’ Meeting in Uruguay.111 Its distinctive feature 
has been that not only did it ensure further liberalisation of international trade, but it also 
resulted in the metamorphosis of the GATT into the WTO.112 When the Draft Final Act of the 
Uruguay Round was issued in 1991, it contained a proposal for a new multilateral trade 
organisation.113  
 
In 1994 the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation was agreed 
on.114 The law of this agreement is the principal source of the WTO law.115 The WTO law is a 
complex set of rules dealing with trade in goods and services and the protection of intellectual 
property rights.116 The WTO law addresses a broad spectrum of issues, ranging from tariffs, 
import quotas and customs formalities to compulsory licensing, food safety regulations and 
national security measures.117  
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In addition, the WTO law contains institutional and procedural rules, including those relating 
to decision-making and dispute settlement. 118  Therefore, the Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organisation created the WTO as a new institutional organisation with a legal 
personality, legal capacity and sufficient privileges and immunities.119 It also endowed the 
WTO with decision-making processes, an institutional structure and distinctive functions.120 
 
The establishment of the WTO places the international trade system on a firm constitutional 
footing.121 For the first time, the pillars of international trade system rest on a fully fledged 
international organisation, with an international legal personality. 122  It symbolises not so 
much the creation of an international trade organisation, but rather the commitment of the 
international trading community to a fully operational international trading system.123 
 
The WTO serves two principal functions. Firstly, it provides a set of multilaterally agreed 
rules governing policies and affecting both trade in goods and services and the protection of 
intellectual property.124 Secondly, it provides a forum for administering the rules, settling 
trade disputes and pursuing negotiations to reduce trade barriers and strengthen and extend 
the multilateral rules.125  
 
The DSU creates a single integrated system for the resolution of dispute arising under any of 
the WTO covered agreements.126 According to the Art. 3(7) of the DSU the aim of the WTO 
dispute settlement system is to secure a positive solution to a dispute. The system therefore 
prefers strongly solutions to disputes reached through consultations rather than 
adjudication.127 
 
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a feature that distinguishes it from most other 
regimes of international law.128 The WTO dispute settlement system is unique in international 
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law and highly effective in assuring compliance with the WTO obligations. 129  It is 
centralized, exclusive, compulsory, binding, based on law and administered by independent 
adjudicatory bodies and it is effective also due to the multilateral surveillance of 
implementation.130  
 
There are three institutions that administer the WTO dispute settlement system. Firstly, the 
Dispute Settlement Body establishes panels, adopts panel and Appellate Body reports, 
supervises the implementation of recommendations and rulings and authorizes sanctions for 
failure to comply with dispute settlement decisions. 131 Panel and Appellate Body reports 
adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body are binding to the parties to the dispute.132 
 
Secondly, the Appellate Body is a standing institution composed of seven persons appointed 
by the Dispute Settlement Body and it reviews panel rulings.133 The Appellate Body can 
uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the panel.134  
 
Thirdly, there are panels composed of usually three, but exceptionally five, well qualified 
governmental and/or non-governmental individuals selected from a roster of persons 
suggested by the WTO members.135 For each case, the WTO Secretariat proposes the possible 
panelists who the disputing parties may reject.136 If there is no agreement on the composition 
of the panel after 20 days, however, either party may request that the Director-General of the 
WTO appoints the panelists.137 
 
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism foresees up to four steps in the following order: 
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1) Consultations to attempt to settle the dispute amicably.138 
2) Third-party adjudication by a panel that decides whether a WTO member’s conduct 
violates the WTO treaty.139  
3) The possibility of an appeal (at the request of either party) to be submitted to the 
Appellate Body.140  
4) Implementation and enforcement of the recommendations and rulings adopted by the 
Dispute Settlement Body. 141  Within 30 days after adoption of the Panel or the 
Appellate Body report, the member concerned has to notify its intent to implement the 
recommendations.142 Despite the sometimes ambiguous language of the DSU with 
misleading terms like “recommendation”, the member found in breach of the WTO 
law clearly has an obligation of full compliance in terms of withdrawing the wrongful 
measure.143 
 
In conclusion, since 1995 the WTO has adopted a central role in international trade law and 
important role in international law in general. In the next chapter the practice of treaty 
interpretation in the WTO dispute settlement will be analysed.   
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2. The fragmented practice of treaty interpretation in the WTO dispute 
settlement  
 
The present chapter analyses whether the practice of the WTO dispute settlement regarding 
the treaty interpretation is following the Art. 31 of the VCLT. Firstly, the treaty interpretation 
methods will be analysed (section 2.1.) and, secondly, it will be explained how relevant or 
irrelevant other rules of international law are while interpreting a treaty in the WTO dispute 
settlement (section  2.2.).  
 
2.1. The fragmented practice of the Art. 31(1) of the VCLT 
 
During the practice of treaty interpretation there have been adopted different approaches for 
that. In the next section (section 2.1.1.) it will be explained based on legal doctrine and 
practice which are the treaty interpretation methods required by the Art. 31(1) of the VCLT. It 
will also be analysed which of the methods are applied in the WTO dispute settlement 
(section  2.1.2.). Last but not least, the conclusions on the treaty interpretation approach 
adopted by the WTO dispute settlement will be made (section 2.1.3.). 
 
2.1.1. The meaning of the Art. 31(1) of the VCLT  
 
The Art. 31(1) is the foundation of the method of treaty interpretation.144 The interpretation of 
a treaty is a process to clarify meanings of particular words or terms used in a treaty.145 The 
Art. 31(1) of the VCLT states that “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose”. The ICJ has acknowledged the Art. 31(1) of the VCLT to 
constitute customary international law146 and the WTO Appellate Body has stated the same in 
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their reports.147 These treaty interpretation methods laid down in the Art. 31(1) of the VCLT 
constitute a single framework for treaty interpretation and can now be identified as generally 
applicable and that those rules should be understood and used by all engaged in treaty 
interpretation.148  
 
The Art. 31(1) of the VCLT has four main elements that have to be considered while 
interpreting a treaty - “ordinary meaning”, “context”, “object and purpose” and “good faith”. 
In the following paragraphs the meanings of these elements will be explained. 
 
Firstly, there is the textual (the “ordinary meaning”) method to treaty interpretation.149 The 
textual approach will give meaning to words, for example, by looking these words up in a 
dictionary and trying to give the words, as they are used in a particular context, their 
“ordinary meaning”.150 It is important that the ordinary meaning is most likely to reflect what 
the parties intended.151 The intention of the parties is expressed in the words used by them in 
the light of the surrounding circumstances.152 This is supported by the scholars who believe 
that the text of the treaty is the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties.153 This 
approach centers on the actual text of the agreement and emphasises the analysis of the words 
used.154  
 
Secondly, there is the teleological (the “object and purpose”) method to treaty 
interpretation.155 This approach finds that the most important is to examine the declared or 
apparent objects and purposes of the treaty. 156  Teleological approach has the effect of 
underlining the role of the judge or arbitrator, since he or she will be called upon to define the 
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object and purpose of the treaty.157 Meaning is then given to the treaty with less reference to 
the linguistic meaning of words or subjective intent of the drafters and more with the spirit of 
the treaty in mind, in an attempt to give maximum effect to the treaty’s underlying normative 
values.158 However, such value-based interpretation is probably the approach that risks the 
most fragmentation or conflict between tribunals: if investment tribunals interpret pro 
investors; human rights tribunals interpret pro homine and the WTO Appellate Body and 
panels construe pro traders, the risk of inconsistent outcomes is higher.159 Having regard to 
the object and purpose is more for the purpose of confirming an interpretation. 160  If an 
interpretation is incompatible with the object and purpose, it may well be wrong.161 Thus, 
although Art. 31(1) of the VCLT contains both the textual and the teleological methods, it 
gives precedence to the textual.162 
 
Thirdly, the VCLT 31(1) explicitly adds to the approaches named earlier that the treaty has to 
be interpreted in its context. It means that the interpreter of any phrase in a treaty has to look 
at the treaty as a whole and, as the Art. 31(2) demonstrates, even beyond that.163 The entire 
text of the treaty is to be taken into account as context, including the title, preamble and 
annexes and any protocol to it, and the systematic position of the phrase in question within 
that ensemble.164 Interpretative value can be found in the position of a particular word in a 
group of words or in a sentence, of a particular phrase or sentence within a paragraph, of a 
paragraph within an article or within a whole set of provisions, of an article within or in 
relation to the whole structure or scheme of the treaty.165 The systematic structure of a treaty 
is thus of equal importance to the ordinary linguistic meaning of the words used, in order to 
determine its true meaning.166  
 
Fourthly, the Art. 31(1) of the VCLT also adds that the treaty has to be interpreted in good 
faith. According to the most fundamental rule of the law of treaties, every treaty must be 
performed in good faith. 167  Since interpreting a treaty is a necessary element of its 
performance, logic requires that good faith should be applied also to the interpretation of 
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treaties.168 The entire process of interpretation - i.e. when examining the text, the context, 
object and purpose - has to be conducted in good faith.169 
 
Another question is how these rules have to be applied. Does the court have to consider in 
every case all three approaches in good faith? Or is it enough to use only one of the methods 
if this gives a satisfying solution? This was actually explained by the ILC already in 1966 to 
clear that this article is not a hierarchical order for the application of the various elements of 
interpretation. 170  The article itself is also entitled “General rule of interpretation”, not 
“General rules” in the plural, because the ILC desired to emphasize that the process of 
interpretation is a single closely integrated rule.171 This approach is also called a holistic 
approach. 172  A holistic approach to treaty interpretation would require, thus, reaching a 
conclusion on the ordinary meaning of the term at issue only upon the examination of all the 
relevant elements (taken as a whole), rather than examining each element in turn until the 
meaning of the term at issue is revealed.173  
 
The major international courts have unceasingly relied on the basics of the Art. 31 of the 
VCLT.174 The ICJ is always referring to the Art. 31(1) of the VCLT (whether the parties of 
the case are also parties to the VCLT or not) and it is using all of the interpretation methods 
named in the Art. 31(1) of the VCLT. Some examples of these cases are: Territorial 
Dispute 175 , Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan 176 , Dispute Regarding 
Navigational and Related Rights177, Whaling in the Antarctic178 and Maritime Dispute179. In 
conclusion, the ICJ has never explicitly expressed that it is using the holistic approach, but it 
has also never explicitly stated that the methods laid down in the Art. 31(1) of the VCLT are 
hierarchical. But in these cases the ICJ is actually always applying the interpretation methods 
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in this order they are written down in the Art. 31(1) of the VCLT. Based on the previous case 
law it can be concluded that in these cases the ICJ is using rather the holistic approach. 
 
The view of the ICJ has been shared by several other international courts and tribunals.180  
The ECtHR used the VCLT rules in the case Golder v. United Kingdom: “In the way in which 
it is presented in the "general rule" in Article 3l of the Vienna Convention, the process of 
interpretation of a treaty is a unity, a single combined operation”.181 The court analyses the 
context, the text and the object and purpose of the treaty while interpreting it.182 Also, for 
instance, the ITLOS183, the ICTY184 and the ICTR185 have followed the approach taken by the 
ICJ. 
 
However, the practice of treaty interpretation approaches is not so clear and unified as 
sometimes presupposed. It has been claimed that in modern international law, the textualism 
has actually taken the central position in treaty interptetation. 186  The last ILC Special 
Rapporteur on the law of the treaties Sir H. Waldock has also stated that the ILC has actually 
a strong predilection for textual interpretation.187 Textualism mandates that a legal text must 
be read based upon the meaning of its terms.188 
 
Also, international jurisprudence supports largely the proposition that textualism is the 
dominant interpretive approach, despite the holistic approach formally enunciated by the 
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ILC.189 For instance, the object and purpose of a treaty is often regarded not as one of the 
starting points in the interpretive process but as an auxiliary and largely dispensable element 
that might optionally be used to confirm the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty, or to 
clarify those terms when they are deemed ambiguous.190  
 
This kind of approach was taken, for instance, by the ICJ in cases Kasikili/Sedudu Island191 
and Oil Platforms192.193 Furthermore, an ICDIF tribunal has explained the choice of textual 
approach very clearly in the case RSM Production Corporation v. Grenada: “This strict 
textual approach, i.e., going no further than the ordinary meaning of the text of the treaty, is 
regarded as fundamental in international law. Even though the International Law 
Commission, in its Final Draft Articles (at page 685), suggested that the “process of 
interpretation is a unity and that the provisions of the article [now Article 31] form a single, 
closely integrated rule,” nevertheless, the article itself indicates a clear, logical interpretive 
order in which textual interpretation is primary. Article 31, when read in conjunction with 
Articles 32 and 33 of the Vienna Convention reveals an interpretive structure in which 
subsequent practice and the other two methods of treaty interpretation, subjective and 
teleological, are supplementary in nature. They are to be used to assist in the interpretation 
when the textual method is insufficient.”194 
 
To make it even more complicated, there are courts who prefer other methods of 
interpretation. For instance, the CJEU has developed very early a teleological interpretation in 
favour of Community treaties, often leading it to consider any other rule of interpretation as 
suspicious and liable to conflict with its own objectives.195 Thus, the CJEU privileges the 
teleological interpretation for Community treaties, whilst resorting to other possibilities when 
dealing with non-Community treaties.196 The starting point of this approach may be found in 
the case of De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v. ECSC High Authority in which 
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the court rejected the ordinary meaning of terms in favour of the Community meaning which 
it constructed itself.197  
 
In conclusion, it is very clear that the Art. 31(1) of the VCLT includes four important 
elements that have to be taken into account while interpreting a treaty - “ordinary meaning”, 
“context”, “object and purpose” and “good faith”. Nevertheless, it is not so clear if this rule is 
a strict holistic approach or should other approaches also be accepted. Even though the ILC 
tried to make it work as a holistic rule, it has turned out more as an approach where textualism 
is very often preferred to other methods of interpretation. In the following section it will be 
analysed which is the approach used in the WTO dispute settlement. 
 
2.1.2. The Art. 31(1) of the VCLT in the WTO dispute settlement 
 
In the practice of the WTO dispute settlement the Art. 31(1) of the VCLT have been regularly 
referred to.198 The main reason for these references is the Art. 3(2) of the DSU. According to 
the Art. 3(2) of the DSU the dispute settlement system of the WTO “serves to preserve the 
rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing 
provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law”.199 Art. 3(2) of the DSU confirms the principle of jura novit curia, because 
the panels and the Appellate Body can decide themselves how to interpret the WTO covered 
agreements as long as they respect the customary principles of treaty interpretation. 200 
However, the practice how the panels and the Appellate Body of the WTO refer to the VCLT 
Art. 31(1) and how they interpret this specific provision is not unified.  
 
On the one hand, there are cases where the panels and the Appellate Body of the WTO tend to 
promote the text of the treaty. In some of the cases the panel or the Appellate Body have 
mentioned also the other methods of interpretation, but have stated that the textual approach 
has to be the first one used. This means that the WTO Appellate Body and panels have 
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interpreted the Art. 31(1) of the VCLT as it was a hierarchical list of interpretation methods, 
where the textual method is the preferred one.  
 
For instance, in the US - Shrimp201 the Appellate Body found that the Panel had not followed 
all of the steps of applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international law as 
required by the Art. 3(2) of the DSU.202 The Appellate Body gave an instruction that a treaty 
interpreter must begin with, and focus upon, the text of the particular provision to be 
interpreted.203 It continued to explain that where the meaning imparted by the text itself is 
equivocal or inconclusive or where confirmation of the correctness of the reading of the text 
itself is desired then the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole should be sought.204 Thus, 
the Appellate Body adopted the hierarchical approach in the US - Shrimp case.  
 
Also, in the US - Line Pipe it was clearly expressed by the Appellate Body that the sentence 
they were interpreting does not have one certain meaning alone and they must seek the 
meaning of the terms of this provision in their context and in the light of the object and 
purpose of the agreement.205 Therefore, the Appellate Body showed again that they start the 
interpretation process with textual approach and only in case this does not give a solution they 
move to the other ones.  
 
Another example is the case EC - Sardines. One of the issues disputed between the parties 
was the meaning of the term “standard” as used in the Agreement on TBT.206 The Appellate 
Body decided the issue by application of different textual methods.207  For instance, the 
Appellate Body considered the definition of the term “standard” in the ISO/IEC Guide, but 
did not agree with the consensus requirement provided in this definition.208 In conclusion, the 
Appellate Body decided the meaning of term “standard” without reference to any other 
elements such as the context and the purpose or object of the TBT agreement.209 
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In the US - Gambling the Panel and the Appellate Body inquired into the character of online 
gambling and betting services. 210  They had to decide whether these services should be 
regarded as sporting activities or as other recreational services.211 The Panel considered first 
the definitions of the key terms and then viewed the terms in the context of the treaty.212 Later 
the Appellate Body criticised the way how the Panel had earlier dealt with the problem.213 It 
found that the Panel’s findings were premature.214 The Appellate Body stated that a panel 
may start with the dictionary definitions to find a certain meaning of a term, but dictionaries 
alone are not necessarily capable of resolving complex questions of interpretation.215  
 
However, the Appellate Body did not blame the Panel for preferring textual methods to other 
methods named in the Art. 31(1) of the VCLT. In its own findings the Appellate Body first 
concentrated on the text and found that the language was inconclusive. 216  Secondly, the 
Appellate Body examined the context and concluded that it did not clearly reveal the scope of 
the US concessions.217 And after this the Appellate Body turned to the object and purpose of 
the GATS to obtain further guidance for their interpretation.218 In conclusion, the Appellate 
Body did not use all the methods laid down in the Art. 31(1) of the VCLT as a holistic 
approach, but as a hierarchical approach: it used all of these just because the first and second 
methods were not enough to interpret the provision. 
 
Similar approach was adopted by the Panel in the EC - Chicken Cuts, but later the Appellate 
Body adopted the holistic approach instead. The Panel found quite clearly that the object and 
purpose should be considered after the treaty interpreter had determined the meaning of the 
words constituting the treaty obligation in question when read in their context.219 But later this 
Panel report was criticised by the Appellate Body which referred that the Panel should have 
used the holistic approach.220 
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In the case EC - Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products the Panel uses clearly textual 
approach and even often referred to dictionary. For instance, the Panel used the Oxford 
English Dictionary to determine, for example, the meaning of “to arise from”, “pests”, 
“disease”, “food”, “additives”, “contaminant”, “toxin”, “allergen”, “allergy”221. The Appellate 
Body has also observed earlier that the dictionaries are a useful starting point for the analysis 
of “ordinary meaning” of a treaty term, but they are not necessarily dispositive.222  
 
Nevertheless, the fact that the WTO Appellate Body and panels are relying in their 
interpretation too much on dictionaries has been criticised more.223 Related to EC - Approval 
and Marketing of Biotech Products case it has been criticised that the Panel referred to the 
Oxford English Dictionary while determining whether crops grown for purposes other than 
human or animal consumption can be regarded as food.224 It has been found that the result of 
such interpretation is that the Panel came up with a definition of food which is completely 
unrelated to its understanding in the SPS field, where food is always defined in reference to 
human consumption.225 
 
On the other hand, in some cases the WTO Appellate Body and panels have adopted the 
holistic approach. For instance, in Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II it was noted by the 
Appellate Body that the interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty226, 
but it also added: “The provisions of the treaty are to be given their ordinary meaning in their 
context. The object and purpose of the treaty are also to be taken into account in determining 
the meaning of its provisions.”227 
 
In the case US - Section 301 Trade Act it was clearly held by the Panel that the elements 
referred to in the Art. 31 of the VCLT - the text, context and object-and-purpose, as well as 
good faith - are to be viewed as one holistic rule of interpretation rather than a sequence of 
separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order.228  
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As referred earlier in the current section, the WTO Appellate Body followed for instance the 
holistic approach in the case EC - Chicken Cuts. The WTO Appellate Body found: 
“Interpretation pursuant to the customary rules codified in Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention is ultimately a holistic exercise that should not be mechanically subdivided into 
rigid components.”229 In conclusion, the WTO Appellate Body agreed with the interpretation 
made by the Panel, but it did not do it in the same way as the Panel.  
 
Another example of a case where the Appellate Body adopted the holistic approach is the US 
- Continued Zeroing where the Appellate Body stated that the principles of interpretation that 
are set out in the Art. 31 and 32 of the VCLT are to be followed in a holistic fashion.230 It 
explained further that the interpretative exercise is engaged so as to yield an interpretation that 
is harmonious and coherent and fits comfortably in the treaty as a whole so as to render the 
treaty provision legally effective.231 A word or term may have more than one meaning or 
shade of meaning, but the identification of such meanings in isolation only commences the 
process of interpretation, it does not conclude it.232 
 
A very clear example of the Appellate Body using the holistic approach is also China - 
Publications. It states: “In this respect, we note that the purpose of the interpretative exercise 
is to narrow the range of possible meanings of the treaty term to be interpreted, not to 
generate multiple meanings or to confirm the ambiguity and inconclusiveness of treaty 
obligations. Rather, a treaty interpreter is required to have recourse to context and object and 
purpose to elucidate the relevant meaning of the word or term. This logical progression 
provides a framework for proper interpretative analysis, bearing in mind that treaty 
interpretation is an integrated operation, where interpretative rules and principles must be 
understood and applied as connected and mutually reinforcing components of a holistic 
exercise.”233 
 
In Argentina - Financial Services the Panel also applied a a holistic appraoch, even though it 
was not explicitly stated. In its report the Panel expressed: “Nevertheless, before turning to 
the context, we recall that Article 31.1 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
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states that the starting point for an interpretative exercise is the “the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty”. Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention adds that the basis of 
interpretation shall be not only the ordinary meaning of the terms but also “their context and 
in the light of [the treaty's] object and purpose”.”234 
 
Moreover, there are cases where it is actually hard to say which approach was being used. 
They use all the methods named in the Art. 31(1) of the VCLT and they do it in the sequence 
of the methods named in the article. But the panels or the Appellate Body do not state that it is 
holistic or hierarchical approach. For example, in China - Electronic Payment Services, the 
Panel explained that it will first determine the ordinary meaning of relevant terms used, then 
turn to the context and, finally, consider the object and purpose of the GATS and the WTO 
Agreements.235 It might seem like this is a hierarchical approach, because the methods laid 
down in the Art. 31(1) of the VCLT are followed in a certain order. But on the other hand it 
can be understood that the Panel is rather just stating how is it going to interpret the term and 
later all methods have equal weight. 
 
In conclusion, the treaty interpretation in the practice of the WTO dispute settlement is not 
unified - on the one hand, there are cases where the panels and the Appellate Body prefer 
hierarchical approach and, on the other hand, there are cases where they have clearly adopted 
holistic approach. Furthermore, there are cases where it is hard to understand which approach 
is being used. It is also hard to argue that the practice of the panels and the Appellate Body is 
moving towards one of the approaches. In the next section it will be analysed whether this is 
in accordance with the general rules of treaty interpretation that are laid down in the 
Art. 31(1) of the VCLT and whether the criticism towards the WTO dispute settlement is 
justified. 
 
2.1.3. Conclusions on the practice of the Art. 31(1) of the VCLT in the WTO dispute 
settlement 
 
In the current section it will be analysed whether the practice of the WTO dispute settlement 
is in accordance with the interpretation methods that are laid down in the Art. 31(1) of the 
VCLT and used in practice of other international courts and tribunals. Also, different opinions 
of scholars on this issue will be discussed.  
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In the previous section (section 2.1.2.) it was explained that in some cases the WTO Appellate 
Body and panels have adopted the holistic approach and in other cases the textual approach. 
There are some scholars stating that the approach of the Appellate Body and the panels is not 
always compatible with the standards established by the Art. 31 of the VCLT, because in 
some reports they have not adopted the holistic approach.236 It has been mostly reasoned that 
the approach laid down in the Art. 31 of the VCLT is actually meant to be a holistic 
interpretation.237 There is usually no single “ordinary” meaning of a word and, thus, there is 
the need for a direct link to the context and the treaty’s object and purpose.238 That linkage 
immediately qualifies any impression that the ordinary meaning is simply a literal 
approach.239 Context and object and purpose are not additional or optional elements, but 
pointers to the appropriate ordinary meaning.240  
 
It has been claimed that the textual method obviously reduces the importance of the purpose 
and object of a treaty, as an interpreter is required to consider those elements only in order to 
confirm the results obtained through purely textual methods to clarify a text which remains 
equivocal or inconclusive after the application of textual methods.241 Furthermore, a former 
member of the Appellate Body has also stated that in following the approach of the Art. 31 of 
the VCLT, the Appellate Body has attached the greatest weight to the ordinary meaning of the 
terms of the treaty.242 Even though the context has less weight, but is certainly more often 
used and relied upon than the object and purpose.243 
 
Nevertheless, in the section 2.1.1. it was explained that also other international courts and 
tribunals have adopted the textual approach. Furthermore, it has been accepted in legal 
literature that the text is usually getting the most attention while interpreting a treaty. Thus, I 
do not agree with the criticism towards the WTO. In these articles it is portrayed as the WTO 
dispute settlement is the only one applying textual approach and all the others apply holistic 
approach. But if one sees the practice of treaty interpretation on a broader scale, it is clear that 
the practice of treaty interpretation is fragmented in general, not only related to the WTO.  
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I also think that considering every single time the object and purpose of a WTO treaty could 
create even more problems. Namely, the object and purpose of a WTO treaty is probably 
related to the functioning of international trade. If this is considered too seriously, it could 
cause a contradiction with the problem will be analysed in the section 2.2. In the section 2.2. 
it will be explained how the WTO Appellate Body and panels do not always follow the Art. 
31(3)(c) and they tend to emphasize only the trade rules and principles. However, if we 
strictly require the Appellate Body and panels every single time to analyse the object and 
purpose of a WTO treaty, the other rules of international law might be left with too little 
attention in the end.  
 
In conclusion, there are cases where the WTO Appellate Body and the panels have clearly 
adopted the holistic approach of treaty interpretation. Also, there are cases where textual 
approach is preferred. Even though this fact has been criticised by many legal scholars, it does 
not seem to be a problem caused by the WTO. Namely, there are many other international 
courts and tribunals who use textual method for interpreting treaties and this has also been 
accepted in legal literature. Thus, it is impossible to say that the WTO dispute settlement is 
causing the fragmentation of international law concerning the practice of the Art. 31(1) of the 
VCLT. 
 
2.2. The fragmented practice of the Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT 
 
In the current section it will be analysed whether the WTO follows the Art. 31(3)(c) of the 
VCLT in its dispute settlement practice. Firstly, the meaning of the Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT 
will be explained based on legal doctrine and practice (section 2.2.1.). Secondly, the use of 
the Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT in the WTO dispute settlement will be analysed (section 2.2.2.). 
Thirdly, conclusions on the Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT in the WTO dispute settlement will be 
made (section 2.2.3.).  
 
2.2.1. The meaning of the Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT 
 
The Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT states that while interpreting a treaty together with the context 
there should be taken into account also any other relevant rules of international law applicable 
in the relations between the parties. This is called systemic integration and during this process 
international obligations are interpreted by reference to its normative environment or system 
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more broadly.244 All treaty provisions receive their force and validity from general law, and 
set up rights and obligations that exist alongside the rights and obligations established by 
other treaty provisions and rules of customary international law.245 None of these rules has 
any intrinsic priority against each other.246 The Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT is not restricted to 
general international law but extends to any relevant rules of international law applicable in 
the relations between the parties.247 
 
But the principle of systemic integration goes further and it points to a need to take into 
account the normative environment also more widely.248 Whatever is their subject matter, 
treaties are a creation of the international legal system and their operation is based upon that 
fact.249  The normative element cannot be ignored and when interpreting the treaties, the 
principle of integration should be borne in mind.250 The rules need to be seen in a view of 
some comprehensible and coherent objective, to prioritize concerns that are more important at 
the cost of less important objectives.251  
 
The rule laid down in the Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT has a firm basis in the principle of good 
faith, because according to that principle every party to a treaty must in principle be presumed 
to intend to keep its treaty obligation in conformity with its other obligations under 
international law.252 
 
This is all that the Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT requires: the integration into the process of legal 
reasoning - including reasoning by courts and tribunals - of a sense of coherence and 
meaningfulness.253 Often no formal reference to the Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT is necessary 
because other methods provide sufficiently the need to take into account the normative 
environment.254 
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The systemic integration laid down in the Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT views the international 
legal order as one single system and allows drawing conclusions from that perspective.255 
Thus, it has a great potential to be one of the means to mitigate the effects of the 
fragmentation of international law, since the treaty interpretation can on the basis of this rule 
transgress the borders of specialized regimes of international law and try to find a meaning for 
the terms in question that reflects the common basis of legal rules in an integrated system of 
international law.256 However, if the courts or tribunals do not use in practice the Art. 31(3)(c) 
it cannot also protect the international law against the fragmentation and can, furthermore, 
trigger the fragmentation of international law even more.257 
 
The Art. 31(3)(c) consists of two important parts. Firstly, it states that “any other relevant 
rules of international law” has to be taken into account. Secondly, the provision continues that 
these rules have to be “applicable in the relations between the parties”. These requirements 
will be analysed separately. 
 
Firstly, the requirement “any other relevant rules of international law” referred to in Art. 
31(3)(c) of the VCLT does not seem to be limited to any particular sources of international 
law.258 The Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT directs the international courts and tribunals to take 
account of treaty provisions, customary international law and general principles of law as 
these are described as sources of international law according to the Statute of the ICJ.259 
Furthermore, irrespective of the fact that that the word “rules” would imply that only legally 
binding instruments can play a role under the Art. 31(3)(c), parts of international judicial 
practice seem to apply this condition somewhat less restrictively and also consider non-
binding documents as material relevant for interpretation.260 
 
Secondly, the requirement that the external rules are “applicable in the relations between the 
parties” presupposes that the latter are legally bound by those rules, either because they have 
given their consent to them as treaty rules, or, because they are addressed by them as binding 
customary rules or general principles of international law, or because they are bound for other 
reasons, such as acquiescence or unilateral declaration.261 
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In practice there has arisen the question what to consider a party in this context. The VCLT 
defines a “party” as a state which has consented to be bound by the treaty and for which the 
treaty is in force.262 It is actually a question whether it refers to the parties to the treaty or the 
parties to a particular dispute under that treaty.263 But it rather seems that the latter approach 
is more common and justified and the first approach seems hardly compatible with the overall 
structure of the Art. 31 of the VCLT.264 
 
The Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT is referred to in the practice of international courts and 
tribunals and, thus, the systematic approach has been adopted also in practice. Some examples 
of cases where the ICJ has referred to the Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT are Case Concerning the 
Right of Passage over Indian Territory265, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued 
Presence of South Africa in Namibia266, Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros267 and Oil Platforms268. 
 
The systematic interpretation laid down in the Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT has been very often 
referred to by ECtHR. In Golder v. United Kingdom, the ECtHR referred to this article when 
it had to determine whether the Art. 6 of the ECHR guaranteed a right of access to the courts 
for every person wishing to commence an action in order to have his civil rights and 
obligations determined.269 It was held that the reference to “relevant rules of international 
law” in the Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT includes general principles of law and especially 
general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.270  
 
But the general principles of international law are not the only sources being referred to in the 
practice of the ECtHR. For example, the ECtHR has referred to another human rights treaties 
than ECHR in many court cases.271 Furthermore, in the Loizidou v. Turkey case the ECtHR 
made reference also to certain acts of international organisations, another generally 
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recognised source of international law.272  Pursuant to the Art. 31(3)(c), the ECtHR took 
account of two UN Security Council Resolutions and decisions of the Committee of Ministers 
of the Council of Europe, the European Community and the Commonwealth Heads of 
State.273 
 
Also, the Iran - US Claims Tribunal has expressly deployed the Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT 
and has referred to a wide range of materials on the law of diplomatic protection in 
international law.274 And in the MOX Plant case in OSPAR Arbitration the tribunal made an 
express reference to the Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT.275 Nevertheless, it held that neither of the 
instruments referred by Ireland were in fact “rules of law applicable between the parties”.276 
In the Rhine Railway arbitration the tribunal referred to the Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT and 
considered modern principles of international environmental law relevant for the 
interpretation of bilateral treaties concluded by Belgium and the Netherlands.277 
 
In practice, the reports of the WTO Appellate Body and panels are not always in accordance 
with the Art. 31(3)(c) and of its interpretation by other international courts and tribunals. The 
next section will analyse it more precisely.  
 
2.2.2. The Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT in the practice of the WTO dispute settlement 
 
The relationship between the WTO rules and the other rules of international law is not always 
clear. It is generally accepted that customary international law and general principles of law 
are applicable within the WTO law, unless the WTO law expressly contains clearly deviating 
rules.278 It is also generally accepted that international law plays an important role in the 
interpretation of the provisions of the WTO law.279 The WTO rules should, if possible, be 
interpreted in such a way that they do not conflict with other rules of international law.280 
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And, of course, in the practice of the WTO dispute settlement the Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT 
should be followed too, but in reality the practice of it is rather fragmented.  
 
On the one hand,  there is practice of the WTO dispute settlement that is in accordance with 
the Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. In 1996 the WTO Appellate Body stated in its very first report 
that the WTO law “should not be read in clinical isolation from public international law”.281 
Therefore, the rules of general international law and rules of other regimes of international 
law (so-called non-WTO rules) should be applicable and relevant also in the WTO dispute 
settlement. There are cases where this statement and the Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT is referred 
to and followed by the panels or the Appellate Body of the WTO. 
 
For instance, in the US - Shrimp case the Appellate Body made an extensive reference to 
international environmental law texts.282 The Appellate Body took into account multilateral 
environmental agreements, including the Convention on Biological Diversity and the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, in interpreting the exception for 
measures relating to the conservation of “exhaustible natural resources” in the Art. XX(g) of 
the GATT.283 Relying on these international agreements, the Appellate Body found that the 
term “exhaustible natural resources” includes both living and non-living resources, and thus 
that the US could invoke this exception to justify its regulation that aimed at the protection of 
the sea turtles.284 The Appellate body also took account of Art. 56 of the UNCLOS in support 
of the proposition that natural resources could include both living and non-living sources.285 
Furthermore, in the US - Shrimp case the Appellate Body also referred to general principles of 
international law in the meaning of the Art. 31(3)(c), namely the principle of good faith and 
the related doctrine of abus de droit.286   
 
In the Chile - Price Band System case the Panel interpreted and applied the agreement 
between Chile and Mercosur in a way that excluded its consideration in the present case.287 
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The Panel applied a non-WTO treaty in order to operate a renvoi - by interpreting it so as to 
allow a treatment in a WTO context that would not have been allowed under it (thus creating 
the presumption that had the agreement not been interpreted in such a way, then the WTO 
standard would have been inapplicable).288 
 
In the US - FSC case the Appellate Body found that there is no universally agreed meaning 
for the term “foreign-source income” in international tax law.289 While interpreting this term 
the Appellate Body referred to the SCM Agreement which was not relevant in the current 
case and found that foreign-source income refers to income generated by activities of a non-
resident taxpayer in a foreign state which have such links with that state so that the income 
could properly be subject to tax in that state.290  
 
In EC - Sardines and in EC and Certain Member States - Large Civil Aircraft the WTO 
Appellate Body considered the principle of non-retroactivity reflected in the Art. 28 of the 
VCLT a general principle of law.291 It found that this principle is relevant to the interpretation 
of the WTO covered agreements.292 
 
On the other hand, there is also practice of the WTO dispute settlement that is conflicting with 
the Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. It cannot be excluded that sometimes there exists a conflict 
between the WTO law and other international law that cannot be resolved through 
interpretation. 293  In such cases, the question arises whether provisions of international 
agreements on the environment, human rights or minimum labour standards can be relied 
upon in trade disputes as justifications for violations of the WTO obligations.294 There are 
cases where the WTO Appellate Body and the panels have refused to accept rules that derive 
from other regimes of international law.  
 
In the EC - Hormones case the WTO Appellate Body considered the status of precautionary 
principle. It stated that the status of the precautionary principle is subject to debate and by 
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some scholars it is regarded as having crystallized into a general principle of customary 
international environmental law.295 The Appellate Body concluded that whatever the status of 
that principle is under international environmental law, it had not become binding for the 
WTO.296  
 
This approach taken by the WTO Appellate Body in the case EC - Hormones suggests that 
environmental law and trade law might be governed by different principles.297 Which rule to 
apply would then depend on how a case would be qualified in this regard.298 This might seem 
problematic as denominations such as trade law or environmental law do not have clear 
boundaries.299 For example, maritime transport of oil links to both trade and environment, as 
well as to the rules on the law of the sea.300 Should the obligations of a ship owner in regard 
to the technical particularities of a ship, for instance, be determined by reference to what is 
reasonable from the perspective of oil transport considered as a commercial activity or as an 
environmentally dangerous activity?301 The responses are bound to vary depending on which 
one chooses as the relevant frame of legal interpretation.302 
 
In the Mexico - Taxes on Soft Drinks case the Appellate Body found that there is no basis in 
the DSU for panels and the Appellate body to adjudicate non-WTO disputes:303 “Mexico's 
interpretation would imply that, in order to resolve the case, WTO panels and the Appellate 
Body would have to assume that there is a violation of the relevant international agreement 
(such as the NAFTA) by the complaining party, or they would have to assess whether the 
relevant international agreement has been violated. WTO panels and the Appellate Body 
would thus become adjudicators of non-WTO disputes. As we noted earlier, this is not the 
function of panels and the Appellate Body as intended by the DSU.”304 In the same case of 
Mexico - Taxes on Soft Drinks, the Appellate Body also refused to decide whether the “clean 
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hands” doctrine relied on by Mexico was indeed part of the WTO law.305 This approach - 
refusing to decide one way or another - was also used in the case EC - Sugar regarding the 
principle of estoppel.306  
 
In the case EC - Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products a question came up about the 
Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. One of the issues was whether the Panel could take account of 
other rules of international law and non-WTO law such as the Convention on Biological 
Diversity.307 There is an agreement that a non-WTO rule that is binding upon all WTO 
members, such as international custom or a general principle of law, can be considered when 
interpreting WTO agreements.308 What is unclear is to what extent a non-WTO rule that only 
binds a subset of the WTO membership or not even all the parties to a dispute can be taken 
into consideration.309 
 
The Panel found that the Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT was relevant in the current case.310 The 
Panel agreed that this provision includes all sources of international law as set out in the Art. 
38 of the ICJ Statute.311 The problem arose when the Panel was analyzing the meaning of the 
term “parties” within the meaning of the Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. The Panel limited the 
scope of application of the Art. 31(3)(c) to rules applicable in the relations between the parties 
to the treaty, here the WTO Agreement.312 It dismissed the view that the reference to “parties” 
in the Art. 31(3)(c) would have meant merely parties to the dispute.313  
 
Therefore, the Panel found that only these rules of international law have to be taken into 
account that are binding to all members of the WTO.314 The Panel based its finding on the 
Art. 2(1)(g) of the VCLT which defines a party meaning “a state which has consented to be 
bound by the treaty and for which the treaty is in force”.315 As a result, the Panel did not feel 
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obliged to consider the Convention on Biological Diversity or the Biosafety Protocol, because 
the USA, one of the disputants, was not bound by them.316 
 
Furthermore, in the EC - Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products case the WTO Panel 
was prepared to take into account the precautionary principle of international environmental 
law, if it were established that it had achieved the status of a general principle of law.317 The 
Panel also considered the argument by the EC that the precautionary principle might, since 
1998 when the argument had been made in the EC - Hormones case, have been established as 
a general principle of international law.318 The Panel approved that would this be the case, it 
would then become relevant under the Art. 31(3)(c).319 However, it found that the legal status 
of the precautionary principle remains unsettled and it need not take a position on whether or 
not the precautionary principle is recognised principle of general or customary international 
law.320 
 
There are two important aspects of the case EC - Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products. First, the Panel accepted that the Art. 31(3)(c) applied to general international law 
and other treaties.321 Second, it interpreted the Art. 31(3)(c) so that the treaty to be taken into 
account of must be one which all parties to the relevant WTO treaty are also parties to.322 This 
second contention has been criticised a lot, because it makes it practically impossible ever to 
find a multilateral context where reference to other multilateral treaties as aids to 
interpretation under the Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT would be allowed.323 
 
In the more recent case of EC and certain member States - Large Civil Aircraft, the Appellate 
Body was departing from the Biotech panel’s approach in the certain circumstances.324 Still, 
its decision in this respect was cryptic and cautious.325 The Appellate Body noted: “In a 
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multilateral context such as the WTO, when recourse is had to a non-WTO rule for the 
purposes of interpreting provisions of the WTO agreements, a delicate balance must be struck 
between, on the one hand, taking due account of an individual WTO Member's international 
obligations and, on the other hand, ensuring a consistent and harmonious approach to the 
interpretation of WTO law among all WTO Members.” 326  This is clearly an important 
statement, but the decision is noteworthy for its extreme caution and its decided unwillingness 
to set out this approach in bold statements.327  
 
Furthermore, in that same case of EC and certain member States - Large Civil Aircraft the 
Appellate Body decided that, regardless of the way one interprets “the parties” in the 
Art. 31(3)(c), it did not need to refer to the agreement in question, because the EC had not 
shown precisely how it was “relevant” to the specific legal question at issue.328
 
This is another 
noteworthy feature of the WTO jurisprudence on the Art. 31(3)(c): while some others have 
tended to downplay the legal significance of the term “relevant” in Art. 31(3)(c), the 





In conclusion, the treaty interpretation in the practice of the WTO dispute settlement is not 
unified also in the question whether other rules of international law are considered while 
interpreting a treaty. On the one hand, there are cases where the panels and the Appellate 
Body have acted in accordance with the Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. On the other hand, there 
are cases where they have clearly made decisions that are conflicting with the Art. 31(3)(c) of 
the VCLT. In the next section it will be discussed whether this is in accordance with the 
VCLT and, if not, whether there can be a reasonable justification.  
 
2.2.3. Conclusions on the practice of the Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT in the WTO dispute 
settlement 
 
Based on the previous section (section 2.2.2.), it can be concluded that the practice of the Art. 
31(3)(c) of the VCLT is not unified. More precisely, in the practice of the WTO dispute 
settlement there are both - cases where the Art. 31(3)(c) is followed and cases where it is not 
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done by the panels nor the Appellate Body. Related to these cases where the Art. 31(3)(c) of 
the VCLT is not followed, we can talk about fragmentation of international law.  
 
There is an academic debate over the role of non-WTO law in the WTO adjudication. From 
one perspective, there are scholars who strongly argue that non-WTO law should be 
applicable and sometimes even prevail over the WTO rules.330  
 
In their treaty relations states can contract out of one, more or even all rules of international 
law (other than jus cogens rules), but they cannot contract out of the system of international 
law. 331  The prohibition on setting up a treaty regime outside international law can be 
compared to the prohibition on a limited number of individuals under domestic law setting up 
their own state within another state.332 This unitary view of international law prohibiting the 
creation of sub-systems completely delinked from general international law rules is crucial to 
avoiding the situation where a particular regime of international law becomes a safe haven 
(either for states to escape obligations or for domestic pressure groups to circumvent domestic 
legal constraints by insulating their particular interests in a cocoon, impermeable to 
limitations or restrictions that they may face even under domestic law).333  
 
The Art. 1(1) of the DSU states that the WTO dispute settlement system settles the disputes 
between members concerning their rights and obligations under the provisions of the WTO 
Agreement and of the DSU taken in isolation or in combination with any other covered 
agreement. It does not exclude reference to other international law rules when interpreting the 
WTO provisions.334 Furthermore, there are other treaty provisions which confirm that the 
WTO should be seen as part of international law. Art. 3(2) of the DSU states clearly that rules 
of interpretation play role in the WTO dispute settlement.335 TRIPS Agreement incorporates 
several obligations from existing intellectual property law conventions, with Art. 9(1) 
requiring members to comply with certain provisions of the Berne Convention for the 
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Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.336 Last but not least, in the practice of the WTO 
dispute settlement the Appellate Body and the panels have frequently referred to rules and 
principles of general international law.337 
 
From another perspective, several scholars have suggested that the WTO adjudicating bodies 
are to apply as substantive law only the WTO law.338 The Art. 7 of the DSU equally suggests 
as much by essentially specifying the applicable law, that is, the covered agreements. 339 
However, non-WTO law can still be regarded as a factual matter in order to interpret the 
applicable WTO provisions, for instance, under the Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT.340 
 
It has also been argued that the WTO system should be considered a self-contained regime.341 
A self-contained regime is a regime which comprises not only rules that regulate a particular 
field or factual relations laying down the rights and duties of the actors within the regime 
(primary rules), but also a set of rules that provide for means and mechanisms to enforce 
compliance, to settle disputes, to modify or amend the undertakings and to react to breaches 
(secondary rules), with the intention to replace and through this to exclude the application of 
general international law, at least to a certain extent.342 Therefore, this argument would justify 
the way how treaties are being interpreted in the WTO dispute settlement.  
 
D. McRae has come up with three main arguments to support this view. Firstly, trade law is 
seen too technical and it has also been held by the trade lawyers that their field is special.343 
Trade relations are in many countries overseen by the economic, trade or commerce ministry 
which is detached from that of foreign affairs which is dealing with public international 
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law.344 Secondly, trade can also be seen as mostly a matter for the private sphere, not a matter 
for governments.345 Thirdly, and most importantly in D. McRae’s view, there is a problem of 
fitting international trade and economic law in general into a discipline that defined itself in 
terms of peace and security, in terms of the territorial integrity and political independence of 
states, in terms of sovereignty.346  
 
However, there are also scholars who do not agree with the previous view and believe that the 
WTO system should not be considered a self-contained regime.347 I also support this opinion 
and there are different arguments to explain it.  
 
Firstly, the conclusion of the WTO Agreement as a formal treaty and the creation of the WTO 
as an international organisation are developments that had the effect of subjecting the WTO 
fully to international law.348 Each treaty that creates a new regime is first of all part of general 
international law as it is created within and according to it.349 Furthermore, the previous WTO 
Director-General P. Lamy has explained that the reliance of the WTO Appellate Body and 
panels on rules of the VCLT is a clear confirmation that the WTO wants to see itself as being 
as fully integrated into the international legal order as possible. 350  Therefore, the WTO 
Appellate Body and panels have also adopted the approach that the WTO system is not a self-
contained regime. Also, as referred earlier, the Appellate Body has itself stated that the 
agreements should not be read “in a clinical isolation from public international law”.351 The 
Appellate Body meant that public international law enters into the WTO system through the 
channel of treaty interpretation as the relevant normative context.352 
 
Secondly, J. Pauwelyn has criticised that this international law that D. McRae refers to (in his 
third argument) is the international law of co-existence prevalent up to the end of the First 
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World War.353 Since then international law has expanded its scope so as to include also law 
on co-operation.354  Together with disciplines such as international human rights law and 
environmental law, international trade law is a testimony to this expansion into new fields 
where states realised the need to co-operate in order to tackle common problems.355  
 
Nevertheless, even if we do not see the WTO system as a self-contained regime, there can still 
be found reasonable explanations why the reports by the panels and the Appellate Body are 
sometimes conflicting with the Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. Of course, it is easier to find the 
downside of the reports and criticise the WTO for that. Nevertheless, there are arguments that 
help to understand and to reason the approach taken by the WTO. In this sense I agree with 
A. Lang who argues that the response of the WTO Appellate Body and panels to cases 
involving fragmentation is more often driven by caution rather than the myopia of which it is 
often accused.356  
 
The Appellate Body’s and panels general reluctance to make formal and explicit reference to 
non-WTO law is not quite the same as normative closure.357 It is probably fair to say that the 
Appellate Body and panels do take a great deal international law into account which does not 
formally enter the pages of its reports.358 Furthermore, the Appellate Body is intensely aware 
of the reality of the fragmentation of international law, and very conscious of the high stakes 
of their decisions for other areas of international law, that it has as a consequence adopted a 
self-consciously cautious and non-confrontational style of decision-making.359 After all, in 
cases which raise potential normative conflicts between the WTO and non-WTO law, the 
Appellate Body and the panels find themselves in a difficult position, being asked to 
adjudicate cases involving fundamental values conflicts which are hardly amendable to 
judicial resolution, at least not without threatening the legitimacy of the tribunals to whom the 
task falls. 360  The Appellate Body and the panels are, thus, actively seeking to avoid 
addressing the problem of normative conflicts, refusing to hierarchise different regimes of 
international law, rejecting anything which looks like an attempt to systematise or 
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constitutionalise international law, and leaving controversial questions as open as possible, for 
as long as reasonable.361 
 
It is especially understandable, because the members of the WTO Appellate Body and panels 
are - first of all - trade experts. The Art. 17(3) of the DSU requires that the Appellate Body 
shall be comprises of persons of recognised authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, 
international trade and the subject matter of the covered agreements generally. The Art. 8(1) 
of the DSU requires that panels shall be composed of well-qualified governmental and/or 
non-governmental individuals, including persons who have served on or presented a case to a 
panel, served as a representative of a member or of a contracting party to GATT 1947 or as a 
representative to the Council or Committee of any covered agreement or its predecessor 
agreement, or in the Secretariat, taught or published on international trade law or policy, or 
served as a senior trade policy official of a member. Thus, it might be too much to expect 
from them an extensive knowledge of all specific regimes of international law, like 
environmental law, human rights law etc. Also, they are not this kind of academic scholars - 
as the ones criticising their reports for being controversy to the VCLT - who only see the 
theoretical side of the problem. I rather think they solve the issues from a practical 
perspective, questioning which solution is better for the parties to the dispute. After all, 
according to the Art. 7(3) of the DSU the aim of the WTO dispute settlement is to secure a 
positive solution to a dispute.  
 
In conclusion, I support the view that the WTO dispute settlement system is part of 
international law and, thus, the rules of general international law and other regimes of 
international law should also have an impact while settling a dispute in the WTO. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the reports made by the panels and the Appellate Body 
should be directly disapproved. As explained earlier, there can be reasonable justifications for 
these reports and, furthermore, it is rather important to analyse which real effect this causes to 
international law and community in general. This question will be addressed in the next 
chapter.   
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3. The effect of the fragmented practice of treaty interpretation in the WTO 
dispute settlement to international law and community in general 
 
As explained in the previous chapter, the practice of treaty interpretation in the WTO dispute 
settlement is fragmented. The current chapter will give an overview of the effect of the 
fragmented practice of treaty interpretation in the WTO dispute settlement to the international 
community and international law in general. It gathers opinions reflected about fragmentation 
of international law in legal bibliography by different scholars and analyses whether the same 
problems are relevant related to treaty interpretation in the WTO dispute settlement. 
Furthermore, it analyses whether these are just theoretical problems reflected in academic 
articles or do these exist also in the reality.  
 
The reactions to the phenomenon of fragmentation of international law have varied and 
changed over time - originally they were rather hostile and negative, but recently 
fragmentation is seen in a more positive light.362 The current chapter analyses both positive 
and negative effects of the fragmentation and does not aim to give an opinion whether it is 
only positive or only negative.  
 
Firstly, it will be discussed how the fragmented practice of treaty interpretation in the WTO 
dispute settlement decreases the credibility and reliability of the WTO (section 3.1.) and, 
secondly, how it decreases the authority of the WTO (section 3.2.). Thirdly, it will be 
analysed whether the fragmentation might trigger forum shopping (section 3.3.) and, last but 
not least, how the fragmentation might strengthen international law in general (section 3.4.).  
 
3.1. Decreasing the credibility and reliability of the WTO  
 
In his speech to the General Assembly in 2000, the former president of the ICJ G. Guillaume 
addressed his concerns for the consequences of the proliferation of international courts and 
tribunals: “The proliferation of international courts gives rise to serious risks of conflicting 
jurisprudence, as the same rule of law might be given different interpretations in different 
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cases. This is a particularly acute risk, as we are dealing with specialized courts that are 
inclined to favour their own discipline.”363  
 
On the one hand, it has been found by several other scholars that because of the fragmentation 
of international law the legal subjects are no longer able to predict the reaction of official 
institutions to their behaviour and, therefore, they are also not able to plan their activity 
accordingly.364 The reason for that is the possibility of conflicting judgments from different 
international courts and tribunals.365 A settlement reached by one organ will only resolve a 
dispute within that system and not necessarily for the purpose of another or the universal 
system.366 Divergent solutions and conflicting judgments can undermine the credibility and 
reliability of international institutions and international law in general.367 
 
The importance of international trade law was discussed previously in the section 1.2.1. and it 
was stated that international trade rules are necessary, because the traders and investors need a 
degree of security and predictability. The predictability and security resulting from 
international trade rules will encourage investments and trade and will thus contribute to 
global economic welfare. Unfortunately, the practice of the WTO dispute settlement is 
controversial and is in conflict with general rules of international law and other regimes of 
international law. In the section 2.2.3. it was concluded that the WTO Appellate Body and 
panels tend to consider the sources of general international law and the sources of other 
regimes of international law irrelevant while interpreting a treaty. Thus, it can be argued that 
in the WTO dispute settlement the disputes are also very often resolved only within the WTO 
system which makes the solutions different than these could be in other dispute settlement 
systems. This can be disappointing to parties to the dispute.  
 
On the other hand, it can also be argued that in a situation where the WTO Appellate Body 
and panels would start applying all treaties of environmental law, human rights law and other 
special regimes, the outcome of the dispute would get even more unclear than it is now. The 
WTO dispute settlement system is specialised on applying the WTO law mostly and, thus, the 
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subject can also rather predict how the WTO Appellate Body and panels apply these specific 
treaties.  
 
It is also important to bear in mind that in contrast to the position in common law countries, 
there is no doctrine of binding precedent in international law.368 The Art. 38(1) of the Statute 
of the ICJ names the sources of international law and it refers to judicial decisions as a 
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.369 The Statute also expressly provides 
that a decision of the ICJ is not binding on anyone except the partiers to the case in which that 
decision is given and even then only in respect of that particular case.370 Thus, there is no 
reason to believe that the legal subjects should always have the idea what is the outcome of 
their dispute.  
 
Moreover, it has been argued that the debate on fragmentation has made international judges 
even more aware of the responsibility they bear for a coherent construction of international 
law.371 As explained in the section 2.2.3., the Appellate Body and panels also seem to be 
aware of the reality of the fragmentation of international law and have rather adopted a 
cautious decision-making style.372 However, the international judiciary has developed a set of 
tools to cope with the undesirable aspects of both fragmentation and proliferation, and appears 
to employ it in full awareness of these challenges on a regular basis.373 The so-called toolbox 
of international law is not perfect, but is flexible enough to assist negotiators, lawyers and 
judges in finding the right balance between different specialised regimes of international 
law.374 This toolbox is the normative basis provided by the rules of general international law 
and the VCLT.375 Thus, it is extremely important that at least the rules of general international 
law and the VCLT are used and interpreted in the same way in different courts and tribunals.  
 
Nevertheless, the WTO Appellate Body and panels have rather failed in this task, as their 
practice related to treaty interpretation according to the Art. 31 of the VCLT is not unified. 
The only things that the WTO Appellate Body and panels have done against fragmentation of 
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international law, are the frequent references to the decisions by the ICJ and other 
international courts, mostly with respect to treaty interpretation.376 But this does not mean that 
they follow the treaty interpretation rules in every decision they make.  
 
It has also been argued that the risk of conflicting judgments is largely a theoretical problem, 
because the fundamentals of general international law tend to remain the same regardless of 
which tribunal is deciding the issue.377 It might be true in some regimes, but the 2nd chapter 
of the current thesis clearly explained how the practice of the WTO dispute settlement is 
fragmented concerning the treaty interpretation rules. Treaty interpretation is an important 
part of general international law that should remain the same in every dispute settled in 
different regimes.  
 
Also, the scholars who tend to express their concern about the dangers of incoherent case law 
base their analysis on only one or several international law cases which have become famous 
for this reason.378 Usually this case is the divergence in approaches between the ICJ in the 
Nicaragua case and the ICTY in the second appeal decision by the Appeals Chamber in the 
Tadic case in respect of the conditions under which the actions of an armed non-state actor 
can be attributed to the state.379  
 
Another example brought out by many scholars is the MOX Plant case.380 The question raised 
in the MOX Plant case was whether the conflict is about the law of the sea, about pollution of 
the North Sea or and issue related to inter-European Community relationships.381 The ITLOS 
even held that the application of the same rules by different institutions might be different 
owing to the differences in the respective context, object and purposed, subsequent practice of 
                                                         
376  Simma, p. 283. See also: Appellate Body Report. US Standards for Reformulated Gasoline. 1999. 
WT/DS2/AB/R, p. 17; Appellate Body Report. Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages. 1996. WT/DS8,10-
11/AB/R, p. 12; Appellate Body Report. Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy 
Products. 1999. WT/DS98/AB/R, para 81. 
377 Fauchald and Nollkaemper. Introduction. 2014, p. 6.  
378 Dupuy, P.-M. The Unity of Application of International Law at the Global Level and the Responsibility of 
Judges. - European Journal of Legal Studies. 2007/1. No. 2, p. 36. 
379 Ahmad, S., Choudhry, I. A. Alleged Fragmentation of International Law: Magnitude of the Problem and 
Available Solutions. - Journal of Political Studies. 2015/22. Issue 2, p. 689; Dupuy 2007, p. 36; See also: 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Merits) 
I.C.J. Reports 1986 pp 64-65; Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Judgment of 15 July 1999, Case No. IT-94-1-A, A.Ch. 
380 See for example: Ahmad and Choudhry, p. 683-685; Deplano, R. Fragmentation and Constitutionalisation of 
International Law: A Theoretical Inquiry. - European Jouranl of Legal Studies. 2013/6. Issue. 1, p. 69; 
Koskenniemi, M. Constitutionalism, Managerialism and the Ethos of Legal Education. - European Journal of 
Legal Studies. 2007/1. Issue 1; Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, paras 10, 439-
442. 
381 Ahmad and Choudhry, p. 684. 
 57 
parties and travaux preparatoires.382 There are more cases, where the question of conflicting 
judgments has arisen, but these are still rather exceptional.  
 
In the view of the current thesis it is important that these cases are not related to trade law and 
have not been settled in front of the WTO Appellate Body or panels. Therefore, it is possible 
to conclude that at least in trade law and WTO law the problem of conflicting judgments is 
merely a theoretical and does not exist in practice. Furthermore, it is rather difficult to state 
that the conflicting judgments of the Nicaragua case and Tadic case have somehow decreased 
the credibility and reliability of the ICJ and the ICTY.  
 
In conclusion, I agree that the fragmented practice of international law can, to some extent, 
decrease the credibility and reliability of international institutions and international law. This 
seems to be especially a possible problem with the WTO dispute settlement system, because 
the questions where they have gone into conflict with general international law and other 
regimes of international law are one of the most important ones - the treaty interpretation 
rules laid down in the Art. 31 of the VCLT. On the other hand, it does not seem to be a 
problem in reality. So far there are no trade law cases which have been solved in contrary 
fashion by different international courts or tribunals. Moreover, if the WTO Appellate Body 
and panels would start applying all specialized treaties, probably the outcome of the dispute 
would get even more unclear.  
 
3.2. Decreasing the authority of the WTO 
 
In the previous section it was analysed how the fragmentation of international law can affect 
the credibility and reliability of the WTO in a sense that the subjects of international law 
cannot be sure what is the outcome of their dispute. Another question is how this affects the 
authority of the WTO in general.383 In the chapter 2 it has been explained that the practice of 
treaty interpretation is fragmented in the WTO dispute settlement. Furthermore, this situation 
has been discussed and criticised by many scholars (see the sections 2.1.3. and 2.2.3.). But is 
it a real problem affecting the reputation of the WTO or is it rather a theoretical problem 
represented only in legal research?  
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One of the most painful events in the history of the WTO is probably the protests held in 
Seattle during the ministerial conference of the WTO in November 1999. The protesters 
focused on issues including workers’ rights, sustainable economies and environmental and 
social issues.384 Later these protests came to seem as not only silly, but also misguided.385 
Most people were pro-democracy activists protesting at the dangerous unfairness at the 
current model of free trade, while agreed that international trade is beneficial to everyone.386 
Instead, the media preferred to distort the protestors’ concerns saying that they were all anti-
trade and against the WTO.387 In conclusion, it was more an anti-globalisation movement than 
an anti-trade movement.388 Even if it caused some damage to the reputation of the WTO, it 
was just superficial.    
 
In the view of the current thesis, the concept how the protests were carried out is actually very 
controversial. Some of the protesters were wearing sea turtle costumes to show that they are 
against the Appellate Body’s decision in the US - Shrimp case, which concerned also sea 
turtles.389 In the view of the current thesis, the US - Shrimp case is one of the few cases being 
praised for the way how the Appellate Body referred to international environmental law and 
general international law while interpreting a treaty. Even if the outcome was not acceptable 
for everyone, at least the way how the Appellate Body interpreted the treaty was in 
accordance with the VCLT. 
 
However, in reality the WTO does not have a remarkably negative reputation. It is rather the 
other way around - the WTO dispute settlement system has been praised for its substantial 
and distinguished role in strengthening the effectiveness of the WTO law. 390  The WTO 
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dispute settlement system is often called the “Crown Jewel of the WTO” 391 and also the 
“World Trade Court”392. It has been stated that the WTO dispute settlement system is very 
successful in resolving trade disputes.393 It has attracted enormous interest because of its 
binding, rule-oriented nature and its well-established appeals system, both a rarity at the 
international level.394 New members continue to seek accession to the organisation to gain 
nondiscriminatory access to new markets, to complement politically controversial but 
important domestic economic reforms and to benefit from the security of a rules-based trading 
system.395 
 
One of the clear signs that the WTO has a good reputation is the amount of cases it solves 
every single year. The WTO is the only global intergovernmental organisation concerned with 
the rules of trade between nations: it is the leading forum for trade negotiations and for the 
resolution of trade disputes. 396  Thus, it covers now over 98 percent of world trade. 397 
Moreover, the WTO has one of the most active international dispute settlement mechanisms 
in the world.398 The number of applications has increased considerably since the beginning of 
the WTO and has probably exceeded the expectations of the negotiators of the DSU.399 The 
current Director-General R. Azevêdo has stated that the fact that the WTO reached a 
significant milestone with the receipt of its 500th trade dispute for settlement in 2015 shows 
that the WTO dispute settlement system enjoys tremendous confidence among the 
members.400 2015 was the busiest year on record for the WTO dispute settlement system, with 
an average of 30 active panels per month.401 The Dispute Settlement Body adopted 11 panel 
reports, compared to 9 in 2014.402 
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Secondly, the fact that the member states are content with the work of the WTO and its 
dispute settlement is another sign of a good reputation. Currently there are 164 members and 
22 observers of the WTO.403 The observers have to start accession negotiations within five 
years of becoming observers.404 Thus, the WTO has the central position in international trade 
law, since it covers almost all of the trade in the world. 
 
Recently the reputation of the WTO has been a hot topic in the news, because of the 
statements made by D. Trump, the president of the USA. During his election run he made 
clear that the WTO has lost its effectiveness and this may lead to the USA withdrawing from 
the WTO. 405  It has also been stated that the D. Trump’s administration of the USA is 
preparing to ignore any rulings by the WTO that it sees as an affront to USA sovereignty.406 It 
is clear that these kind of statements are made because of other, rather political reasons. This 
situation is not related to the treaty interpretation practice in the WTO dispute settlement. 
Furthermore, this opinion of D. Trump has been criticised a lot.407 It has been predicted that if 
the USA would really withdraw from the WTO, it would not bring dramatic consequences.408 
Probably the leadership would just go over to China and the loss would be rather on the side 
of the USA.409   
 
In conclusion, the concern about the authority of the WTO is understandable, because the 
WTO dispute settlement is not always following the rules of general international law, but the 
reality does not show any negative trend in the authority of the WTO dispute settlement. 
Furthermore, the WTO and especially its dispute settlement system is actually being praised 
since it is very fast and effective.  
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3.3. Triggering forum shopping 
 
As explained earlier in the section 1.1.2., the amount of international courts and tribunals and 
enlarged international case law is also one of the reasons of the fragmentation of international 
law. The clearest effect of the proliferation of international courts and tribunals is that the 
multiple proceedings may result in divergent outcomes which may lead to the hassles of 
forum shopping.410  
 
The term “forum shopping” typically refers to the act of seeking the most advantageous venue 
in which to try a case.411 In international law it is a relatively new problem as previously there 
were not many courts or tribunals whose jurisdictions overlapped.412 The biggest concern 
with forum shopping among international tribunals seems to be the concern of inconsistent 
rulings, because they leave the dispute unsolved and can also threaten the stability and 
legitimacy of the broader system which the tribunals operate.413 
 
In practice it is common that the disputes related to trade law include also other special 
regimes of law and then raises the question where should these disputes be settled. A perfect 
example of this is the Chile - Swordfish case. This case highlights the complexity of the 
relationship between environmental and trade rules.414  
 
The EU brought the case before the WTO in April 2000 and a Panel was established by the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body in December 2000.415 Chile insisted that the issue is not of a 
commercial nature, but related to the need for conservation measures ensuring the sustainable 
fisheries for swordfish.416 On this basis, Chile invited the EU to engage in formal dispute 
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settlement under the UNCLOS. 417  The EU agreed and in May 2000, the EU and Chile 
informed the WTO Dispute Settlement Body that, pursuant to Article 3.6 of the DSU, they 
intend to notify to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body any mutually agreed solution to the 
matters raised under the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the covered 
agreements once any such mutually agreed solution has been ratified in accordance with their 
respective domestic law requirements. 418  In November 2000, the parties agreed ad-
referendum to the establishment of a special five-judge Chamber of the ITLOS and the 
agreement was ratified in December 2000.419 
 
In conclusion, the Chile - Swordfish case is an example of a complicated situation where 
possibly forum shopping could exist, but in this case the parties have peacefully agreed in 
which tribunal to solve the dispute.  
 
It has been argued that the international trade law system triggers very strongly forum 
shopping between the dispute settlements conducted by the WTO and NAFTA. 420 
M. L. Busch brings out five reasons for that. Firstly, it is the way how the WTO itself 
addresses the problem.421 On the one hand, the WTO claims to have compulsory jurisdiction 
over those disputes that arise among its members.422 On the other hand, the WTO approves 
preferential trade agreements under Article XXIV of the GATT, taking into account that 
many have dispute settlement mechanisms of their own, thus inviting forum shopping. 423 
Secondly, there are clearly differences in law across the WTO and NAFTA.424 Thirdly, there 
is little variation in the timeliness of proceedings.425 Fourthly, the NAFTA never permitted 
defendants to block panel reports, a feature that compared favourably to GATT, but has been 
woven into the WTO.426 Fifthly, the availability of remedies at the end of a dispute might be 
also one factor for forum shopping.427 The WTO and NAFTA outline similar procedures 
whereby a wronged complainant might seek redress, though NAFTA provisions, on occasion, 
allow for more direct compensation.428 
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Even though these arguments might be true and there might be some possibility to forum 
shopping between the WTO and the NAFTA dispute settlement, none of the previous five 
factors makes different the way how treaty is being interpreted in the WTO and the NAFTA. 
For instance, it has been claimed that related to the Mexico - Soft Drinks case there existed 
some forum shopping between the WTO and the NAFTA, but it was not related to the treaty 
interpretation.429 Furthermore, NAFTA is a regional agreement which is agreed only between 
the USA, Mexico and Canada.430 Thus, these previously presented concerns are relevant only 
in disputes where these certain states are involved.  
 
Moreover, in some cases it might be even hard to predict which is the outcome from the WTO 
dispute settlement, because of two reasons. Firstly, the WTO Appellate Body and the panels 
tend to have also controversial practice relating to treaty interpretation and, thus, the legal 
subject can never be sure which interpretation approach would be chosen during settling the 
specific dispute. Secondly, even if the legal subject would know which treaty interpretation 
method would be used, it is still hard to tell what is the exact outcome of the interpretation, as 
it is a very complicated process. Thus, if the subject cannot predict the outcome, how can he 
choose the most advantageous venue for solving the dispute? 
 
The same applies to the problem that non-WTO rules tend to be irrelevant in the WTO dispute 
settlement. It may be argued that it triggers forum shopping, because it is more clever to file 
an action to the tribunal or court which would recognize also other treaties and would not 
follow the approach taken by the WTO. However, as the case law by the WTO is also itself 
fragmented - there are cases where rules of other regimes of international law are taken into 
account and cases where these rules play no role - it is again hard to predict the outcome of a 
dispute.  
 
In conclusion, the fear of forum shopping might be a realistic problem in some rare cases. 
Nevertheless, in questions related to treaty interpretation it seems rather a hypothetical or 
theoretical problem and it has not really existed in practice. Thus, it is hard to argue that the 
fragmented practice of treaty interpretation of the WTO dispute settlement is somehow 
affecting or even triggering forum shopping. 
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3.4. Strengthening international law 
 
One of the possible outcomes of fragmentation of international law is the strengthening of 
international law in general, because it is a normal development of a globalised world. 
Development of international law can be seen as a common-law-like process involving the 
accretion of judicial decisions.431 
 
The phenomenon of the diversification of the specialized substantive fields of law is not only 
relevant to international law, but also to domestic systems of law.432 Even though in domestic 
law fragmentation is frequently perceived as pathologic because of difficulties to identify 
among a plethora of rules, the proper applicable rule, in particular by their addressees.433 
However, it can be argued that the fragmentation of international law is also not a pathology, 
but a result of a normal development of international law.434 In the section 1.1.2. the reasons 
and background of the fragmentation were discussed and each of the reasons were also natural 
developments of the society.  
 
The development of international law by international tribunals is, in the long run, one of the 
important conditions of their continued successful functioning and of their jurisdiction.435 
Treaties concluded in the last decades have consolidated and expanded diverse fields 
including the law of the sea, international trade law, human rights, environmental law and 
international criminal law.436 Most of these areas of international law are served by their own 
special monitoring bodies or tribunals.437 Each time a new international tribunal is proposed 
under any new regime, the need for its establishment is carefully considered.438 The creation 
of a tribunal is often justified by the special futures of the regime it is meant to serve by way 
of implementation and development.439 Judge R. Higgins of the ICJ has found new tribunals 
important because of certain decentralisation of some of the topics with which the ICJ can in 
principle deal to new, highly specialised bodies, whose members are experts in a subject 
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matter which becomes ever more complex, which are more open to non-state actors and 
which can respond rapidly.440  
 
The fragmentation of international law is, thus, rather a sign of the vitality of international 
law, because the proliferation of rules, regimes and institutions also strengthens international 
law.441 The emergence of new regimes of international law, novel types of treaties or clusters 
of treaties is a feature of the social complexity of a globalising world.442 These deviations do 
not emerge as legal or technical mistakes, but rather they reflect the differing pursuits and 
preferences of actors in a pluralistic global society.443 The fragmentation of international law 
very often reflects the diversity of values and alternatives within different circumstances.444 
 
International law may be a unified system at some level (in the sense, for example, that all of 
its rules and specific regimes interact and are governed by certain general rules), but it is also 
a universe of different systems, sub-systems or regimes at another level. 445  As it was 
explained also in the section 1.1.2., the reason for this is mostly the fact that there is no 
centralised authority and no judicial power in international law.446 In international law every 
judicial organ has its own separate source of legitimisation, or legal empowerment, which 
invests it with judicial power (whether it be the consent of the parties or, in exceptional 
circumstances, the decision of a constitutionally authorised organ), rather than deriving it 
from a common, centralised pool that infuses all courts with judicial power and by the same 
token related them to each other.447 
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The fragmentation of international law may even sabotage the evolution of a more democratic 
and egalitarian international regulatory system.448 One of the positive effects of fragmentation 
of international law is the increase in generation of more detailed and specific laws, because 
the fragmentation of international law also reflects a growing specialization of international 
regulations and regimes.449 Specialization accommodates various needs and concerns of the 
parties engaged in international adjudication.450  
 
One strength of the multiplicity of international tribunals is also that it permits a degree of 
experimentation and exploration, which can lead to improvements of international law.451 The 
lack of strictly hierarchical system provides international tribunals with the opportunity to 
contribute collectively ideas that might be incorporated into general international law.452 It 
also facilitates the evaluation of those ideas by the international community as a whole.453 
Ultimately, one would expect that the best ideas will be adopted widely, contributing to the 
body of international law.454 An overly strict hierarchical structure for international decisions 
could place undesirable constraints on the development of general international law and 
specialized law for special areas.455  
 
Fragmentation reflects the necessity of offering different institutions with different structures, 
which permits people to resort to the institutions that is the best fit for a given dispute.456 
Special courts and their rules of procedure can better accommodate the special needs of 
certain situations. 457  Such special regimes could be used to progressively develop 
international law and serve as a precedent for a global regime.458 
 
It has been claimed that in most cases these specialised international courts and tribunals are 
quite conscious of the need to align their jurisprudence with the well-established norms of 
international law.459 For instance it has been found that the boom of investment arbitration 
contributes to the development of general international law by rendering decisions on 
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questions such as attribution of conduct to states, preclusion of wrongfulness, treaty 
interpretation and others.460 That the increase of investment decisions also leads to a certain 
number of inconsistencies is probably normal in any developed legal system and, thus, the 
risk of fragmentation should not be exaggerated.461  
 
General principles of international law, particularly those pertaining to international treaty 
interpretation provide a necessary basis for the application and implementation in every 
specific regime.462 If these rules are followed then it adds strength to the international legal 
system without affecting the unity and coherence of international law.463 The problem with 
the WTO dispute settlement is that they tend to implement the rules of treaty interpretation 
provided by the VCLT differently than the ICJ and other international courts and tribunals.   
 
Nevertheless, the WTO and its dispute settlement is actually a very good example of a well 
working specialised system of international law. It has concluded a comprehensive legislation 
concerning trade law and the Appellate Body and the panels gather experts of trade law. In 
this sense the WTO has definitely contributed to the strengthening of international law. It is 
clear that the panels and the Appellate Body have also developed international trade law 
through the WTO’s dispute settlement system.464 They have clarified the obligations of the 
members of the WTO.465 There are also many procedural developments that the Appellate 
Body has provided - burden of proof, judicial economy, completing the analysis, stare decisis 
and amicus briefs.466  
 
In the view of the current thesis it is more important to analyse how the panels and the 
Appellate Body have contributed to the strengthening of international law through their way 
of interpreting treaties. While interpreting a treaty, they have clarified the meaning of the 
treaty provisions.467 They have, thus, made a substantial contribution to the development of 
international trade law.468 But on this basis, any court that interprets a treaty and gives reasons 
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is contributing to the development of international law.469 The real question is whether the 
panels and the Appellate Body have done a good job of interpreting and applying the law.470 
As explained in the chapter 2, the panels and the Appellate Body have rather departed from 
the general rules of treaty interpretation laid down in the Art. 31 of the VCLT.  
 
However, it has been explained earlier in the current chapter that the WTO is still working 
very effectively and is enjoying rather a good reputation. The WTO Appellate Body and 
panels are solving a huge amount of cases every year and the parties to the disputes tend to be 
rather satisfied with the outcome. Maybe the way how the WTO Appellate Body and panels 
interpret treaties should also be seen as a positive innovation. We can see this as a sign that 
we should not be too much stuck in the rules of the VCLT, which were laid down decades 
ago. Maybe it is time to let the international court system to develop naturally in a way where 
it can perform the most effectively and come up with the best solutions to the parties of the 
case, even if it is sometimes a little bit conflicting with the VCLT. 
 
In conclusion, the fragmentation of international law can indeed strengthen international law. 
The proliferation of international courts and tribunals and the diversification of the specialized 
regimes of law is an essential feature of the social complexity of a globalising world. The 
WTO has definitely contributed to the strengthening of international law in this sense, as it 
has drawn up a specific system of international trade law. On the other hand, it is important 
that these specialised systems have to align their jurisprudence with the well-established 
norms of international law, for example with the rules of treaty interpretation provided by the 
VCLT. In this sense the WTO dispute settlement has not contributed to the strengthening of 
international law, because it has not successfully implemented the rules of interpretation of a 
treaty in its practice. Nevertheless, this could be seen also as a positive innovation, since we 
should let the international court system to develop naturally in a way where the parties to the 
dispute get the most satisfying outcome.  
  
                                                         





The current master’s thesis aimed, firstly, to find out whether the practice of treaty 
interpretation in the WTO dispute settlement is fragmented compared to the practice of 
general international law and other special regimes of international law. Secondly, the 
purpose of the current master’s thesis was also to analyse the possible effect of the 
fragmented practice of treaty interpretation in the WTO dispute settlement to the international 
community and international law in general. 
 
Regarding the first research question it can be concluded that the practice of treaty 
interpretation in the WTO dispute settlement is to a certain extent indeed fragmented. The 
current master’s thesis analysed two main issues - the treaty interpretation methods in the 
practice of the WTO dispute settlement and the irrelevance of other rules of international law 
in the practice of the WTO dispute settlement.  
 
Firstly, it was analysed whether the treaty interpretation methods used in the practice of the 
WTO dispute settlement are in accordance with the methods provided by the Art. 31(1) of the 
VCLT. Also, the practice regarding the Art. 31(1) of the VCLT of other international courts 
and tribunals was analysed. It can be concluded that the practice of the WTO dispute 
settlement is not unified. On the one hand, there are examples where the WTO Appellate 
Body and panels have explicitly followed the holistic approach while choosing the methods of 
interpretation. It means that the WTO Appellate Body and the panels have tried to reach the 
conclusion on the ordinary meaning of the term at issue only upon the examination of all the 
relevant elements, taken as a whole, rather than examining each element in turn until the 
meaning of the term at issue is revealed. On the other hand, sometimes the WTO Appellate 
Body and the panels of the WTO tend to promote the text of the treaty and have adopted 
rather a textual or hierarchical approach.  
 
Even though the WTO Appellate Body and the panels have been criticised by many scholars, 
because of using textual or hierarchical approach, I do not agree with this opinion. There are 
many other international courts and tribunals who use textual method for interpreting treaties 
and this has also been accepted in legal literature. Thus, it is impossible to say that the WTO 
dispute settlement is causing the fragmentation of international law concerning the practice of 
the Art. 31(1) of the VCLT. 
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Secondly, it was discussed whether the rules of general international law and rules from other 
regimes of international law are considered relevant by the WTO Appellate Body and the 
panels in the WTO dispute settlement. The Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT requires that other 
relevant rules of international law applicable between the parties have to be taken into account 
while interpreting a treaty.  
 
The practice of the WTO dispute settlement is again not unified. On the one hand, there are 
examples where the WTO Appellate Body and panels have acted in accordance with the 
Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. Furthermore, the WTO Appellate Body stated even in its very first 
case that the WTO law “should not be read in clinical isolation from public international law”. 
This approach is actually in accordance with the requirements of the VCLT. 
 
On the other hand, there are cases where the WTO Appellate Body and the panels have 
refused to accept rules that derive from other regimes of international law. In this sense the 
practice of the WTO dispute settlement is fragmented compared to other international courts 
and tribunals. However, there are scholars who support the view that the WTO is a self-
contained regime and, thus, it can be justified that the other rules of international law are 
sometimes irrelevant in the adjudication in the WTO dispute settlement. This view is not 
supported by the current master’s thesis.  
 
Nevertheless, even if the WTO system is not seen as a self-contained regime, there can still be 
found reasonable explanations why the reports by the panels and the WTO Appellate Body 
are sometimes conflicting with the Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. In this sense I agree with 
A. Lang who argues that the reason for that is rather that the WTO Appellate Body and panels 
have adopted a self-consciously cautious and non-confrontational style of decision-making. 
The Appellate Body and the panels are very often seeking to avoid addressing the problem of 
normative conflicts, refusing to hierarchise different regimes of international law, rejecting 
anything which looks like an attempt to systematise or constitutionalise international law, and 
leaving controversial questions as open as possible, for as long as reasonable.  
 
It is especially understandable, because the members of the WTO Appellate Body and panels 
are, above all, trade experts. Thus, it might be too much to expect from them an extensive 
knowledge of all specific regimes of international law, like environmental law, human rights 
law, international criminal law etc. Also, they are not paying so much attention on legal 
 71 
theory, but more on the practical solution, questioning which solution is better for the parties 
to the dispute.  
 
In conclusion, the first hypothesis is correct. The practice of treaty interpretation in the WTO 
dispute settlement is fragmented, at least to a certain extent. Even though there are some 
examples where the WTO Appellate Body and the panels have acted in accordance with the 
VCLT, there are also too many examples of conflicting practice. However, as there are other 
international courts and tribunals whose practice is not in accordance with the holistic 
approach initially required by the Art. 31(1) of the VCLT, it cannot be argued that the WTO 
dispute settlement is causing this fragmentation.  
 
Regarding the second research question it can be concluded that the fragmented practice of 
treaty interpretation affects the international law and community, but these effects are not 
fundamental. Four possible effects of the fragmented practice of treaty interpretation in the 
WTO dispute settlement are being analysed: the decrease of the credibility and reliability of 
the WTO, the decrease of the authority of the WTO, forum shopping and strengthening of 
international law.   
 
Firstly, it is not very likely that the fragmented practice of treaty interpretation decreases the 
credibility and reliability of the WTO. It is likely to some extent, since the WTO Appellate 
Body and panels have gone into conflict with general international law and other regimes of 
international law. On the other hand, it does not seem to be a problem in reality. The risk of 
conflicting judgments regarding international trade law is still a theoretical problem, because 
so far there are no trade law cases which have been solved in a contrary fashion by different 
international courts or tribunals.  
 
Moreover, it can be argued that if the WTO Appellate Body and panels would start applying 
all kinds of international treaties, probably the outcome of the dispute would get even more 
unclear. The WTO Appellate Body and panels are used to applying the WTO law and solving 
the issues related to international trade. They are not familiar with applying, for example, 
environmental law, human rights law or international criminal law. If they would start 
applying the laws of all specific regimes of international law, the parties would have even less 
idea of the result of the dispute. Thus, this would really decrease the credibility and reliability 
of the WTO.  
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Secondly, the fragmentation might also theoretically decrease the authority of the WTO, but 
in practice it does not seem to be a big problem. It’s rather the other way around - the WTO 
dispute settlement is very successfully solving trade disputes. It is claimed to be well-
established and fast. Furthermore, it covers almost all of the trade taking place in the world. 
This is also a reason why the WTO dispute settlement system is often called the “World Trade 
Court”.  
 
Thirdly, conflicting judgments from different international tribunals and courts can also 
trigger forum shopping. There are scholars who argue that there might be some forum 
shopping between the NAFTA and the WTO adjudications, but more precise analysis shows 
that it is not caused by the fragmentation of treaty interpretation. Moreover, as the WTO 
Appellate Body and panels are also not following their own practice, it is also hard to predict 
the exact outcome of the disputes in the WTO dispute settlement. Thus, it is hard to argue that 
the fragmented practice of treaty interpretation of the WTO dispute settlement is in reality 
triggering forum shopping. 
 
Fourthly, it is possible to argue that the fragmentation strengthens international law in 
general. The proliferation of international courts and tribunals and the diversification of the 
specialized regimes of law is an essential feature of the social complexity of a globalising 
world. The WTO has definitely contributed to the strengthening of international law in this 
sense, as it has drawn up a specific system of international trade law.  
 
However, it is important that specialised tribunals and courts have to follow the well-
established norms of international law, for example the rules of treaty interpretation. In this 
sense it is questionable whether the WTO dispute settlement has contributed to the 
strengthening of international law, because it has not successfully implemented the rules of 
interpretation of a treaty in its practice. Nevertheless, why not to see this as a contribution to 
the strengthening of international law? The WTO Appellate Body and the panels are solving a 
lot of cases every year and the parties to the disputes are rather satisfied with the outcome. 
Thus, maybe the way how the treaties are being interpreted in the WTO dispute settlement 
should be seen as a positive innovation.  
 
In conclusion, also the second hypothesis is correct. Even though the treaty interpretation 
practice in the WTO dispute settlement is fragmented, it does not seem to bring extremely 
tragic or irrevocable effects to international law and to international community in general. 
 73 
Thus, we should try to find explanations for this and try to understand why the WTO 
Appellate Body and panels have chosen to interpret treaties this way. Maybe we should 
consider more important the final outcome of the dispute and should not criticise so strictly 
the way how this solution is reached? 
 
As the fragmentation of international law is an extensive and problematic issue, there are a lot 
more ways how to address the problem and, also, how to continue researching it. It seems to 
me that too little attention has been given to the reasons of the WTO Appellate Body and 
panels for making the decisions addressed in the current master’s thesis. Is it just the lack of 
knowledge or are there practical reasons for that? In general, the powers and practices of 
international courts and tribunals to counteract the fragmentation of international law could be 
analysed in the future.  
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Rahvusvaheliste lepingute tõlgendamine vaidluste lahendamisel Maailma 
Kaubandusorganisatsioonis: killustatuse probleem 
Resümee 
 
Rahvusvahelise õiguse killustatusest on räägitud juba aastakümneid. Vaieldud on, kas ja mil 
määral on rahvusvaheline õigus killustunud ning kas tegemist on pigem positiivse või 
negatiivse nähtusega. On mitmeid küsimusi, mille puhul õigusteadlaste arvamused mitte 
ainult ei ühti, vaid on täiesti vastandlikud. Üks sellistest on Maailma 
Kaubandusorganisatsiooni positsioon rahvusvahelise õiguse killustatuses. Kuigi Maailma 
Kaubandusorganisatsiooni apellatsioonikogu rõhutas juba oma kõige esimeses, 1996. aastal 
koostatud raportis, et Maailma Kaubandusorganisatsiooni õigust ei tohiks lugeda isoleeritult 
rahvusvahelisest õigusest, siis endiselt on õhus küsimus, kas seda ka reaalselt vaidluste 
lahendamisel järgitakse. Käesolev magistritöö keskendubki Maailma 
Kaubandusorganisatsiooni positsioonile rahvusvahelise õiguse killustatuse probleemis. 
 
Kuna rahvusvahelise õiguse killustatus on küllaltki lai teema, siis konkreetsemalt käsitletakse 
rahvusvaheliste lepingute tõlgendamist. Lepingute tõlgendamine on vaieldamatult kõigi 
rahvusvaheliste kohtute ja tribunalide üks keskseid ülesandeid. Täpsemalt käsitletakse kahte 
Rahvusvaheliste lepingute õiguse Viini konventsiooni sätet, mis keskenduvad rahvusvaheliste 
lepingute tõlgendamisele. Esiteks käsitletakse artikli 31 lõiget 1, mis sätestab: “Lepingut 
tõlgendatakse heas usus, andes lepingus kasutatud mõistetele konteksti arvestades 
tavatähenduse ning lähtudes lepingu mõttest ja eesmärgist.” Teiseks analüüsitakse Maailma 
Kaubandusorganisatsiooni vaidluste lahendamise organite praktikat seoses artikli 31 lõike 3 
punkti c-ga, mis sätestab: “Rööbiti kontekstiga võetakse arvesse: /.../ rahvusvahelise õiguse 
asjaomaseid norme, mida kohaldatakse osalisriikide suhtes.” 
 
Rahvusvaheliste lepingute tõlgendamine on rahvusvahelise õiguse killustatuse tähenduses 
väga oluline teema, kuna lepingute tõlgendamine saab olla n-ö diplomaatiaks, millega 
välditakse normatiivsete vastuolude esilekerkimist. Rahvusvaheliste lepingute tõlgendamisel 
selgitatakse välja sätete täpne tähendus ning kui kõik rahvusvahelised kohtud ja tribunalid 
kasutavad lepingute tõlgendamisel samu meetodeid, siis on võimalik hoida ära rahvusvahelise 
õiguse killustatust. Juhul kui erinevad rahvusvahelised kohtud ja tribunalid tõlgendavad samu 
reegleid erinevalt, lähtudes seejuures oma valdkonna spetsiifilistest eesmärkidest, väärtustest 
ja kogukonna huvidest, siis see hoopis soodustab rahvusvahelise õiguse killustatust.  
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Isegi kui Maailma Kaubandusorganisatsiooni vaidluste lahendamise praktika soodustab 
rahvusvahelise õiguse killustatust, siis ei ole selge, mis on killustatuse reaalne mõju 
rahvusvahelisele kogukonnale ja rahvusvahelisele õigusele tervikuna. On mitmeid 
õigusteadlaseid, näiteks J. Pauwelyn, D. McRae, L. Gruszczynski ja F. Ortino, kes on oma 
teostes kritiseerinud Maailma Kaubandusorganisatsiooni ning leidnud, et vaekogude ja 
apellatsioonikogu raportid on vastuolus Rahvusvaheliste lepingute õiguse Viini 
konventsiooniga. Samas väga tihti keskenduvad need artiklid ainult konkreetsete raportite 
kritiseerimisele. Ridade vahelt võib lugeda negatiivset hinnangut, kuid nende raportite mõju 
rahvusvahelisele õigusele ja kogukonnale üldiselt analüüsitud ei ole. Seetõttu keskendub 
käesolev magistritöö ka küsimusele, milline on lepingute tõlgendamise killustatuse mõju 
rahvusvahelisele kogukonnale ja rahvusvahelisele õigusele tervikuna. Kas ka tegelikkuses 
esineb probleem või on pigem tegemist probleemiga, mis on esindatud vaid akadeemilises 
kirjanduses?  
 
Kokkuvõttes on käesoleval magistritööl kaks peamist uurimisküsimust. Esiteks, kas lepingute 
tõlgendamise praktika on Maailma Kaubandusorganisatsiooni vaidluste lahendamise 
organites killustatud? Teiseks, kui eelmine küsimus on vastatud jaatavalt, milline on lepingute 
tõlgendamise praktika killustatuse mõju rahvusvahelisele kogukonnale ja rahvusvahelisele 
õigusele tervikuna? Vastavalt neile uurimisküsimustele on püstitatud ka kaks hüpoteesi. 
Esiteks, lepingute tõlgendamise praktika on Maailma Kaubandusorganisatsioonis vaidluste 
lahendamisel killustatud. Teiseks, lepingute tõlgendamise praktika killustatus mõjutab 
rahvusvahelist kogukonda ja rahvusvahelist õigust tervikuna, aga see mõju ei ole 
fundamentaalne.  
 
Magistritöö kirjutamisel on kasutatud mitmeid erinevaid uurimismeetodeid, et jõuda 
rahuldavate ja adekvaatsete tulemusteni. Enamasti on kasutatud analüütilist ja süstemaatilist 
meetodit. Uurimisküsimustele on lähenetud süstemaatiliselt: esmalt uuritakse, kas 
rahvusvaheliste lepingute tõlgendamisel Maailma Kaubandusorganisatsiooni vaidluste 
lahendamise organites esineb killustatus, ning alles seejärel, kui esimene küsimus on vastatud 
jaatavalt, selgitatakse välja, millised on killustatuse tagajärjed. Magistritöös on toodud näiteid 
kaasustest, milles Maailma Kaubandusorganisatsiooni vaekogud või apellatsioonikogu 
tõlgendavad rahvusvahelisi lepinguid. Neid on analüüsitud ning võrreldud nii teiste Maailma 
Kaubandusorganisatsiooni vaekogud ja apellatsioonikogu raportitega kui ka teiste 
rahvusvaheliste kohtute ja tribunalide lahenditega. Seega on magistritöö kirjutamisel 
kasutatud ka võrdlevat meetodit. Lisaks on analüütilist ja võrdlevat meetodit kasutatud 
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selleks, et analüüsida võimalikke killustatuse tagajärgi. Seejuures võrreldakse erinevate 
õigusteadlaste arvamusi.  
 
Parimate lahenduste leidmiseks on kasutatud mitmeid erinevaid allikaid. Suureks abiks olid 
teaduslikud artiklid, uurimistööd ja raamatud erinevatelt õigusteadlastelt. Näiteks on töös 
kajastatud M. Koskenniemi, J. Pauwelyni ja D. McRae ideid, kuna nad on tihti käsitlenud 
rahvusvahelise õiguse, s.h rahvusvahelise kaubandusõiguse killustatuse probleemi. Keskne 
õigusakt magistritöös on Rahvusvaheliste lepingute õiguse Viini konventsioon, kuid viidatud 
on ka muudele lepingutele, näiteks Üldisele tolli- ja kaubanduskokkuleppele ja Põhja-
Ameerika vabakaubanduse lepingule. Suure tähtsusega on ka Maailma 
Kaubandusorganisatsiooni vaidluste lahendamise organite praktika. Magistritöös on 
analüüsitud ainult neid kaasuseid, mis on seotud rahvusvaheliste lepingute tõlgendamisega. 
Läbi on töötatud kogu relevantne praktika alates Maailma Kaubandusorganisatsiooni 
asutamisest 1995. aastal. Kuna magistritöö maht on piiratud, siis on valitud, milliseid 
kaasuseid magistritöös pikemalt analüüsida. Peamiselt on keskendutud kaasustele, mida on ka 
mitmed õigusteadlased oma töödes kas kritiseerinud või kiitnud, kuna see annab võimaluse 
mitmekülgsemaks analüüsiks.  
 
Teemast selgema ülevaate saamiseks on käesolev magistritöö jagatud kolmeks peatükiks. 
Esimene peatükk selgitab teema laiemat tausta. Ühest küljest annab see ülevaate 
rahvusvahelise õiguse killustatusest üldiselt - selle tähendusest, alaliikidest ning põhjustest. 
Lisaks näidatakse ära see suund, mida antud magistritöös analüüsitakse - magistritöö 
keskendub praktika killustatusele, kuid mitte rahvusvaheliste lepingute killustatusele. Teisest 
küljest käsitletakse esimeses peatükis ka rahvusvahelise kaubandusõiguse olemust ning 
Maailma Kaubandusorganisatsiooni positsiooni selles. See peatükk tervikuna loob vajaliku 
aluspinna selleks, et konkreetse teemaga tegeleda. Näiteks selleks, et uurida, kas Maailma 
Kaubandusorganisatsiooni vaidluste lahendamisel kohaldatakse Rahvusvaheliste lepingute 
õiguse Viini konventsiooni korrektselt, on vaja ära näidata, kuidas suhestub rahvusvaheline 
kaubandusõigus üldise rahvusvahelise õigusega. Lisaks on oluline mõista Maailma 
Kaubandusorganisatsiooni vaidluste lahendamise süsteemi, kuna teises peatükis 
keskendutakse oluliselt Maailma Kaubandusorganisatsiooni apellatsioonikogu ja vaekogude 
raportitele.  
 
Teine peatükk tegeleb otseselt esimese uurimisküsimusega - kas lepingute tõlgendamise 
praktika Rahvusvahelise Kaubandusorganisatsiooni vaidluste lahendamise organites on 
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killustatud. Esiteks analüüsitakse Rahvusvahelise Kaubandusorganisatsiooni vaekogude ja 
apellatsioonikogu praktikat seoses Rahvusvaheliste lepingute õiguse konventsiooni artikli 31 
lõikega 1. Seejuures jõutakse järeldusele, et osa raportites on kasutatud holistlikku meetodit 
ning osa raportites on keskendutud lepingute tõlgendamisel eelkõige tekstil. Viimati 
nimetatud lähenemist on kritiseerinud mitmed erinevad õigusteadlased, kuid käesolevas 
magistritöös selle vaatega ei nõustuta. Sellise kriitika eelduseks on, et kõik teised 
rahvusvahelise kohtud ja tribunalid tõlgendavad rahvusvahelisi lepinguid kasutades holistilist 
meetodit. Reaalsuses see aga nii ei ole ning ka õiguskirjanduses on aktsepteeritud, et tekst on 
esmane ja kõige olulisem element rahvusvaheliste lepingute tõlgendamisel.  
 
Teiseks käsitletakse Rahvusvahelise Kaubandusorganisatsiooni vaekogude ja 
apellatsioonikogu praktikat seoses Rahvusvaheliste lepingute õiguse Viini konventsiooni 
artikli 31 lõike 3 punktiga c. Seejuures analüüsitakse, kas vaidlusta lahendamisel Maailma 
Kaubandusoragnisatsioonis võteakse lepingute tõlgendamisel arvesse ka üldise 
rahvusvahelise õiguse ning teiste rahvusvahelise õiguse valdkondade reegleid või lähtutakse 
ainult rahvusvahelisest kaubandusõigusest. Ka selles osas on Rahvusvahelise 
Kaubandusorganisatsiooni apellatsioonikogu ja vaekogud teinud erinevasisulisi lahendeid - on 
nii selliseid raporteid, kus kohaldatakse reegleid teistest rahvusvahelise õiguse valdkondadest, 
kui ka selliseid, kus on jäädud ainult rahvusvahelise kaubandusõiguse kohaldamise juurde. 
Kuigi see, et lepingute tõlgendamisel kohaldatakse ainult rahvusvahelist kaubandusõigust, ei 
ole kooskõlas Rahvusvaheliste lepingute õiguse Viini konventsiooniga, on see siiski 
arusaadav. Nimelt on Rahvusvahelise Kaubandusorganisatsiooni apellatsioonikogu ja 
vaekogude liikmed kaubanduseksperdid ning oleks liiast oodata neilt spetsiifilisi teadmisi 
kõikvõimalikest rahvusvahelise õiguse valdkondadest. 
 
Seega võib teise peatüki kokkuvõtteks öelda, et esimene hüpotees leidis kinnitust. Maailma 
Kaubandusorganisatsiooni lepingute tõlgendamise praktika on killustunud seoses 
Rahvusvaheliste lepingute õiguse Viini konventsiooni artikli 31 lõike 3 punktiga c. Kuigi ka 
Rahvusvaheliste lepingute õiguse Viini konventsiooni artikli 31 lõike 1 praktika ei ole 
ühtlane, siis ei ole õige öelda, et sellist ebaühtlust põhjustaks Maailma 
Kaubandusorganisatsioon. Nimelt ka teised rahvusvahelised kohtud ja tribunalid kohaldavad 
vastavat sätet erinevalt.  
 
Kolmas peatükk keskendub põhiliselt teisele uurimisküsimusele ning seega analüüsib, millist 
mõju omab lepingute tõlgendamise praktika killustatus rahvusvahelisele kogukonnale ja 
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rahvusvahelise õigusele tervikuna. Selles tuuakse välja erinevate õigusteadlaste ideed ning 
lisatud on ka autori oma vaateid. Selle peatüki eesmärk ei ole öelda lõplikult, kas selline 
lepingute tõlgendamise praktika killustatus on positiivne või negatiivne nähtus, vaid pigem 
käsitletakse selle erinevaid tahkusid. Lisaks analüüsitakse võimalike tagajärgede reaalsuses 
esinemist - kas tegemist on pigem fiktsiooni või reaalsete mõjudega? 
 
Esiteks analüüsitakse, kas lepingute tõlgendamise praktika killustatus toob kaasa Maailma 
Kaubandusorganisatsiooni usaldusväärsuse vähenemise. Võib-olla mõningal määral on selline 
tagajärg põhjendatud, kuna Maailma Kaubandusorganisatsiooni apellatsioonikogu ja 
vaekogude raportid on tihti vastuolus Rahvusvaheliste lepingute õiguse Viini konventsiooniga 
ning ka teiste rahvusvahelise õiguse valdkondadega. Samas tegelikkuses ei paista see väga 
suur probleem olevat. Reaalsuses on vastandlike lahendite risk äärmiselt väike, kuna seni ei 
ole rahvusvahelised kohtud rahvusvahelises kaubandusõiguses vastandlikke lahendeid teinud. 
Tegemist on seega pigem teoreetilise probleemiga.  
 
Lisaks on võimalik, et kui Maailma Kaubandusorganisatsiooni apellatsioonikogu ja vaekogud 
hakkaks kohaldama kõikvõimalikke relevantseid rahvusvahelise õiguse lepinguid, siis 
vaidluse lõplikku lahendit oleks veel keerulisem ette aimata. Maailma 
Kaubandusorganisatsioon on siiski spetsialiseerunud kaubandusvaidluste lahendamisele ning 
kaubandusõiguse kohaldamisele. Apellatsioonikogu ja vaekogud ei pruugi olla kursis näiteks 
rahvusvahelise keskkonnaõiguse, inimõiguste või rahvusvahelise kriminaalõiguse reeglitega. 
Kui nad hakkaksid kohaldama selliste spetsiifiliste valdkondade lepinguid, siis ilmselt oleks 
vaidluse osapooltel veel vähem aimu, milline on vaidluse lõplik lahendus. Kokkuvõttes võiks 
hoopis see vähendada Maailma Kaubandusorganisatsiooni apellatsioonikogu ja vaekogude 
usaldusväärsust.  
 
Teiseks kaalutakse kuivõrd kahjustab rahvusvaheliste lepingute tõlgendamise killustatus 
Maailma Kaubandusorganisatsiooni mainet. Ka seejuures on pigem tegemist teoreetilise 
järeldusega, mida praktikas ei esine. Pigem on olukord vastupidi - Maailma 
Kaubandusorganisatsiooni vaidluste lahendamise süsteem lahendab kaubandusvaidluseid 
väga efektiivselt ja kiiresti. Peaaegu kõik maailma riigid kuuluvad Maailma 
Kaubandusorganisatsiooni ja seega katab Maailma Kaubandusorganisatsioon peaaegu kogu 
maailmas toimuvat kaubandust. See on ka põhjus, miks Maailma Kaubandusorganisatsiooni 
vaidluste lahendamise süsteemi kutsutakse tihti Maailma Kaubanduskohtuks.  
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Kolmandaks on argumenteeritud, et rahvusvahelise õiguse killustatus võib viia olukorrani, 
kus vaidluse osapooled hakkavad valima omale meelepärast kohut, kuhu konkreetse 
vaidlusega pöörduda. Õiguskirjanduses on kajastatud mitmeid argumente, miks reaalsuses 
esineb mingil määral selline kohtualluvuse valimine Maailma Kaubandusorganisatsiooni ja 
Põhja-Ameerika vabakaubanduse lepingu vaidluste lahendamise süsteemi vahel. Samas ei ole 
see mitte kuidagi seotud rahvusvaheliste lepingute tõlgendamise küsimustega. Lisaks kuna 
Maailma Kaubandusorganisatsiooni apellatsioonikogu ja vaekogud ei järgi alati ka enda 
varasemat praktikat, siis on keeruline ennustada nende võimalikku otsust mingi konkreetse 
vaidluse puhul. Seega ei ole olukord, kus osapooled valivad omale meelepärast kohtualluvust, 
antud magistritöö tähenduses asjakohane probleem.  
 
Neljandaks on võimalik, et rahvusvahelise õiguse killustatus hoopis panustab rahvusvahelise 
õiguse arengusse. Spetsiifiliste valdkondade tekkimine ning neile vastavate kohtute asutamine 
on normaalne osa globaliseerumisest. Maailma Kaubandusorganisatsioon on panustanud 
rahvusvahelise õiguse arengusse, kuna ta on loonud efektiivselt töötava rahvusvahelise 
kaubandusõiguse süsteemi. Samas on oluline, et ka sellised spetsiifilised rahvusvahelise 
õiguse kohtud järgiksid oma menetluses ja lahendites üldise rahvusvahelise õiguse reegleid, 
näiteks rahvusvaheliste lepingute tõlgendamise reegleid. Kuna Rahvusvahelise 
Kaubandusõiguse apellatsioonikogu ja vaekogud seda alati ei tee, siis on küsitav, kui palju 
Maailma Kaubandusõigus selles osas ikkagi rahvusvahelise õiguse arengusse panustab. 
 
Samas teisest küljest saab lepingute tõlgendamist Maailma Kaubandusorganisatsioonis siiski 
näha kui viisi, kuidas panustada rahvusvahelise õiguse arengusse. Nimelt Rahvusvaheline 
Kaubandusorganisatsioon lahendab igal aastal väga suurel hulgal kaubandusvaidlusi ning 
vaidluste osapooled on pigem rahul vaidluste lahenditega. Seega võib-olla on see hoopis 
märk, et me ei peaks nii rangelt analüüsima, kas Maailma Kaubandusorganisatsiooni praktika 
ikka järgib kõiki reegleid, mis on juba aastakümneid tagasi Rahvusvaheliste lepingute õiguse 
Viini Konventsiooni kirja pandud. Ehk oleks parem näha seda võimaliku uuendusena, mille 
on Maailma Kaubandusorganisatsioon rahvusvahelisse õigusesse toonud? 
 
Kokkuvõttes võib öelda, et rahvusvaheliste lepingute tõlgendamise praktika killustatus ei too 
rahvusvahelisele õigusele ja kogukonnale kaasa põhimõttelisi või pöördumatuid probleeme 
ning seega on ka teine hüpotees leidnud kinnitust. Pigem võiks otsida põhjendusi, miks on 
Maailma Kaubandusorganisatsioon otsustanud probleemidele selliselt läheneda. Võib-olla on 
õigustehnilistest vigadest olulisem see, milline on vaidluste lahendite reaalne mõju 
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osapooltele ning milline on nende rahulolu Maailma Kaubandusorganisatsiooni vaidluste 
lahendamise süsteemiga.  
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